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Abstract:
The past few decades have seen a gradual convergence in corporate governance norms the world over, entailing a 
discernible shift towards shareholder primacy models. It holds particularly true of developing countries, many of which 
have steadily amended corporate governance norms to enhance the scope of shareholder rights. This is usually justified 
through the rationale that increasing protection for foreign investors and shareholders would mean greater investment in 
capital market and overall financial market development. In India, the shift coincides with a series of fundamental 
economic and financial policy reforms initiated in the 1990s: collectively and loosely referred to as liberalisation, this 
process marks a paradigm-shift from a tightly controlled welfare economy to one considerably more laissez-faire in its 
orientation. A fallout of which was that the need to attract and sustain foreign investments acquired an unprecedented 
significance. Indias corporate law change initiatives, particularly those pertaining to shareholder rights and allied 
issues, must be understood in this larger context.
This article empirically tests the hypothesis that enhanced shareholder protection leads to greater levels of investments, 
and financial developments generally. It then uses regression analysis to detect if the change in corporate governance, 
making it more friendly, had any effect on growth in financial market. It is divided into two parts. The first tracks the 
evolution of corporate governance norms in India. A robust qualitative and quantitative analysis is effected to determine 
the tilt towards a shareholder primacy regime that Indian corporate governance regime now displays. The second 
chapter deals with the regression analysis where the outcome variable is financial market growth, explanatory variable 
is change in the governance regime with relevant control variables. We find that change in shareholder primacy 
corporate governance has little effect on financial market growth in India.
We would suggest that instead of changing the law in books, more emphasis should be given to implement those 
regulations and increase the overall rule of law.
Keywords: Comparative corporate governance, corporate governance and financial market 
growth, leximetrics, law and finance
I. INTRODUCTION
It is clear that good corporate governance makes good sense. The name of the game for a 
company in the 21st Century will be conform while it performs. - Mervyn King (Chairperson: King 
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Report)
In the light of the intense competition and dynamism that prevails in the Indian business 
environment at present, one of the keys to long-term growth and success appears to be the ability to 
strike a fine balance between sound corporate governance practice on the one hand and a 
sustainable growth model on the other.1 Corporate governance has become an integral component 
of myriad issues ranging from business standards to accounting standards, from corporate social 
responsibility to supply chain management, from a means for averting potential financial crisis to a 
tool for ensuring macro/microeconomic stability, to a contributor towards the improvement of the 
overall political economy2. Almost all strands of interdisciplinary studies in law, economics and 
finance have by now felt the omnipresence and impact of corporate governance. For a long time, the 
connection between corporate governance and multiple business interests and disciplines was 
merely ideological and mostly theoretical, whilst on the ground, the impact of scholarly work on 
corporate governance was at best ignored and at worst ridiculed for its perceived lack of sound 
business efficacy. However, over the years, with repeated accounting frauds and related crises, there 
has been a growing clamour for an efficient solution to prevent such issues from arising in the first 
place and seek to resolve them in an expedited fashion if they do; this, in turn, encouraged 
theoreticians and practitioners to seek recourse to the traditional notions of corporate governance 
and reinvent the same, albeit in a modern guise, in the early 1990s. 
The emergence, or rather, the revival of this discipline took the world by quite a storm, having 
captured the attention of many a stakeholder with its potential. This coincided with the period 
following the grand success of the neo-liberal economic principles of 1980s, which coupled with 
the fall of the erstwhile Soviet Union, seemed to provide conclusive evidence of the relative 
superiority of free market principles over interference by the State via a controlled economy. The 
free flow of ideas across national and notional boundaries soon ensued, which in turn led to quite an 
intense period that encouraged rapid transplantation of legal ideas the corporate sector was not 
outside the sphere of influence of such change and indeed, one may even opine that the two decades 
1 See generally Jacob Hörisch, Roger Leonard Burritt, Katherine L. Christ, Stefan Schaltegger, (2017) "Legal systems, 
internationalization and corporate sustainability. An empirical analysis of the influence of national and international 
authorities", Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, Vol. 17 Issue: 5, pp.861-875 and     
Malla Praveen Bhasa, (2004) "Global corporate governance: debates and challenges", Corporate Governance: The 
international journal of business in society, Vol. 4 Issue: 2, pp.5-17 for discussions on diverse governance models to 
address the challenges to corporate governance in the context of globalization of best practices.
2 See generally Louise Gardiner, Catherine Rubbens, Elena Bonfiglioli, (2003) "Research: Big business, big 
responsibilities", Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society, Vol. 3 Issue: 3, pp.67-77, for a 
discussion on 'big business' and its growing influence on the rest of the society and the various challenges posed by 
globalisation requiring fresh perspectives on global corporate governance.
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ranging from 1995 to 2014 witnessed a hitherto unforeseen convergence of global corporate law 
standards on an almost exponential scale.3 The only period which even comes close is the period of 
imperialism and colonialism, and even then the transplantation of law was a relatively slow process, 
externally imposed in a forceful manner as it used to be for the most part, rather than consensual 
cooperation. It was not any colonial power this time that ushered in such transplantation, rather 
international financial organisations, which thought of this way to be the most efficacious one to 
consolidate their presence in the global business scenario. 
Such organisations promised that [T]he improvement of corporate governance practices is widely 
seen as one important element in strengthening the foundation for individual countries long-term 
economic performance and in contributing to a strengthened international financial system.4  This 
economic rationale was also picked up by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, which stated that improvements to corporate governance would facilitate investment 
flows and mobilize financial resources for economic development.5 The scope of this paper is 
limited to exploring the degree of fulfilment, at least within the Indian context, of the promise of 
adopting shareholder primacy and corporate governance norms being beneficial towards higher 
financial market growth, thereby justifying convergence and transplantation, specifically in the area 
of company law and corporate governance in developing countries. 
The major corporate governance code available around this time period that could serve as a global 
benchmark was the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, which was based primarily on the 
shareholder value corporate governance model, although it also provided limited space for 
stakeholder models. So in effect what was being recommended to developing countries was a 
shareholder value model based on the Anglo-Saxon template. The claim that was being popularly 
extended at that juncture was that if a country adopted a shareholder primacy corporate governance 
model, then foreign investors would invest in that country, stimulating the financial market, and 
local investors would also pitch in, leading to further growth of the financial market. Surplus capital 
can be used for economically useful, but less well-funded, activities, leading to economic growth 
and a sustainable future. The present paper empirically investigates6 these claims in the Indian 
3 See generally Brian R. Cheffins, The History of Corporate Governance, in The Oxford Handbook of Corporate 
Governance, Douglas Michael Wright et al (eds.), Oxford University Press (March, 2013).
4 The 1999 Memorandum of Understanding between the World Bank and the OECD, establishing the framework for 
the Latin American Roundtable among a series of Regional Corporate Governance Roundtables.
5 UNCTAD, Guidance on good practices in corporate governance disclosure UNCTAD/ITE/TEB/2006/3
6 See generally G. Clarke, L.W. Murray, (2001) "Frames of Reference in Financial Corporate Governance and 
Communications", Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society, Vol. 1 Issue: 4, pp.20-27, 
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context and tries to find out whether changing the corporate governance in India for the better, 
that is, by implementing a pro-shareholder approach, has any correlation with financial market 
growth. 
Part II of the paper provides a brief outlay of methodology adopted in this research, whereas Part III 
provides a general overview of the Indian corporate governance scenario, to be followed by a 
qualitative analysis of evolution of corporate governance and its myriad forms in India in Part IV. 
Part V of the paper continues with the quantitative counterpart of said analysis, thereby 
complementing Part IV in the process. Part VI seeks to provide a quantitative contrast and analysis 
of the changes in governance mechanisms in the Indian corporate sphere and explore the correlation 
of the same to the financial market growth, with the conclusions of the paper being finally reflected 
in Part VII.   
II. METHODOLOGY
The research delineated in this paper consists of multiple steps, the first of which has been the 
creation of a database on the evolution of corporate governance in India for twenty years (1995-
2014), consisting of information on fifty-two separate companies using corporate governance 
variables based on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and previous indices during 
aforesaid period. The variables have been scaled polynomially, i.e., the value could be zero, or one, 
or two; this necessitated a survey that would go beyond a simple yes/no response in order to take 
into account systems using optional rules or soft law. A detailed description of variables is 
available in Appendix A, while the filled-up coded questionnaire for India is available in Appendix 
E.
The second step consists of using a graded response model with a Kalman filter, so as to create a 
dynamic corporate governance index for India, which would in turn allow distribution of the 
changes identified over a period of time, rather than confining them to just one specific year. It is 
widely acknowledged that laws and regulations take some time to show their impact in full, hence 
considering development of corporate governance over a number of years are meant to yield more 
realistic results. Codes for the model have been made available in Appendix D. A Bayesian factor 
analysis has been used to build up a separate multiyear index of financial market growth consisting 
of five variables - foreign direct investment (FDI), market capitalisation of listed companies, S&P 
for a discussion on the significance of empirical research being used to identify the strategic power of corporate values 
in influencing the success of organizations.
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global equity index, volume of stocks traded and the number of listed domestic companies to 
represent the financial growth of countries. These variables are discussed in detail in Appendix B. 
Three control indices of similar timescales comprised a total of ten variables  annual percentage 
growth rate of GDP, purchasing power parity conversion factor, current account balance, real 
interest rate, external debt stocks, commercial bank branches per head of population, mobile cellular 
telephone subscriptions per head of population, electric power consumption per capita, high-
technology (products with high R&D intensity) exports in current USD and the number of patent 
and trademark applications filed at USPTO; all said control variables are discussed at length in 
Appendix C. Following this, Bayesian change point analysis has then been used to identify the 
breakpoints, i.e. the time period or particular year when there was a regime shift (a substantial 
movement away from the previous distribution or, qualitatively speaking, a complete change from 
the previous system). Codes for this analysis have been made available in Appendix D. In the 
corporate governance development index, a breakpoint signifies a complete change from the 
previous system, usually in the form of a completely new corporate governance code that changes 
the previous system. In the financial market development index, a breakpoint signifies either a 
market high or low, compared with recent statistics, and so usually coincides with the peak of a 
boom or the trough of a bust. 
Finally, a country level regression model has been constructed, using the five indices. The financial 
market index has been used as a dependent variable, the dynamic corporate governance index as 
predictor variable and the three control indices as control variables. In course of the analysis, both 
Bayesian and classical regression methods have had to be used. All computer codes used in this 
context have been provided in Appendix D.
III. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INDIA: AN OVERVIEW
According to commentators like Reed, the development of corporate governance in India can be 
understood as a transition across three distinct models of governance, namely the managing agent 
model; the business house model; and, lastly, the Anglo-American model7 (the last two are of 
especial concern to us). Reed proceeds to explain that the business house model was largely a 
7 Ananya Mukherjee Reed, Corporate Governance Reforms in India (2002) 37 Journal of Business Ethics 249.
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creation of the Nehruvian welfare state, where capitalism was tightly regulated.8 As Chakrabarti, 
Megginson, and Yadav have said:9
The turn towards socialism in the decades after independence, marked by the 1951 
Industries (Development and Regulation) Act and the 1956 Industrial Policy Resolution, put 
in place a regime and a culture of licensing, protection, and widespread red-tape that bred 
corruption and stilted the growth of the corporate sector. The situation worsened in 
subsequent decades and corruption, nepotism, and inefficiency became the hallmarks of the 
Indian corporate sector.
This gave rise to the class called promoters, who used their proximity to power centres to obtain 
licences for new industries. The primary function of the promoter  was to float new ventures by 
contributing a minimum of equity capital, and then raising the rest through public offerings or from 
public financial institutions (PFIs).10 Promoters tended to start several unrelated ventures, and 
thereby gain control of a number of firms. This gave rise to so-called business houses, where 
members of a single family held control interests in an array of unrelated concerns.11 Such 
arrangements entailed several consequences. One of these, as Reed notes, was that in corporations 
(and presumably business houses as well), small shareholders and their interests were often 
marginalised mostly due to the considerable power wielded by the business families that owned 
them.12 Gollakotta and Gupta point to a disconnect between equity ownership and actual control 
that also prevailed widely, mainly due to the nationalised financial institutions (which owned 
considerable amounts of equity) not exercising the levels of control that they were entitled to. This 
was because such institutions were not held accountable for the profitability of the investments 
they made, which gave them little incentive to actively participate in the day-to-day affairs of the 
companies they invested in.13
The stringent regulations mentioned earlier began to be dismantled in the 1990s, through a set of 
8 Ibid, 252.
9 Rajesh Chakrabarti, William L Megginson, Pradeep K Yadav, Corporate Governance in India (2007) CFR 
Working Paper 08-02, available at: <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/ 10419/41393/1/582127289.pdf> (accessed 
27 February 2017).
10 Reed 2002, 253.
11 ibid.
12 ibid 256.
13 Kamala Gollakota, Vipin Gupta, History, Ownership Forms and Corporate Governance in India (2006) 12 Journal 
of Management History 185.
Page 6 of 50Corporate Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
C
orporate G
overnance
reforms collectively referred to as liberalisation.14 Changes made to the corporate legal regime 
included augmenting disclosure norms, establishing a National Advisory Committee on Accounting 
Standards, and so forth.15 Indeed, much of the corporate governance reforms we talk about owe 
their origin to this period, such initiatives being the result of the recommendations stemming from 
several committee reports16, as stated below. 
1. Birla Committee, 1999
A committee was set up by Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) under the chairmanship 
of one of the members of the SEBI Board, Kumar Mangalam Birla in 1999 to advance and raise the 
norms of corporate governance. The Committee was framed with the primary objective to view 
corporate governance from the perspective of the investors and shareholders and thereby prepare a 
Code that would fit into the Indian corporate regime. 
The Report submitted by this Committee is distinctive for characterising corporate governance to 
also include all other stakeholders apart from shareholders. It thus examines corporate governance 
from the perspective of the stakeholders and specifically that of the shareholders and investors, 
since they are the raison dêtre for corporate governance and furthermore the foremost group that 
the SEBI is concerned with.17 The main focus of the Report lies in the arrangement of proposals 
which recognizes the duties and commitments of the boards and the administration in organizing the 
frameworks for good corporate governance and stresses upon the rights of shareholders in 
requesting effective implementation of such framework and norms. Most of these recommendations 
are mandatory in nature.18
The Report proceeds on the assumption that shareholders ought to be treated as proprietors of the 
company, and hence in such capacity, they have certain rights and obligations. Be that as it may, in 
actuality company cannot be overseen by shareholder choice alone, and shareholders are not 
anticipated to accept accountability for the administration of corporate issues including compliance 
14 See generally Jayati Sarkar & Subrata Sarkar, Corporate Governance in India, Sage Publications (2012). See also 
Vasudha Joshi, Corporate Governance: The Indian Scenario, Foundation Books Pvt. Ltd. (2004)
15 Reed 2002, 257.
16 See generally Asish K. Bhattacharya, Corporate Governance in India: Change and Continuity, Oxford University 
Press (2016).
17 Report of the Committee Appointed by the SEBI on Corporate Governance under the Chairmanship of Shri Kumar 
Mangalam Birla (Birla Committee Report), available at <http://www.sebi.gov.in/commreport/corpgov.html> 
(accessed 28 Februrary 2017), para 1.5.
18 Ibid, para 1.6.
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and decision-making. A companys administration must have the capacity to make business 
decisions in an expedited fashion. This necessitates the shareholders to essentially delegate a 
significant number of their obligations as proprietors of the company to the directors, who then get 
to be in de facto charge of corporate procedure and operations. The implementation of this 
methodology is usually carried out by a specialist management team. This relationship subsequently 
gets the responsibility of the Board and the administration to the shareholders of the company. A 
decent corporate structure is one that gives sufficient opportunity to the shareholders for powerful 
commitment in the administration of the company, while demanding an exclusive requirement of 
corporate conduct without getting involved in the everyday working of the company.19
The bulk of the Report consists of certain mandatory and recommendatory provisions stretched 
across various paragraphs. Paragraphs 14.5 to 14.16 not only deal with the rights of shareholders in 
detail, but also mentions about institutional shareholders. Paragraph 14.5 mentions the basic rights 
of the shareholders that is inclusive of the right to transfer and registration of shares, obtaining 
relevant information about the company on a timely and regular basis, participating and voting in 
shareholder meetings, electing members of the Board and sharing in the residual profits of the 
company. Paragraph 14.6 subsequently provides the shareholders with a right to be supplied with  
information with respect to decisions relating to material changes such as takeovers, sale of assets 
or divisions of the company and changes in capital structure that may lead to shift in control or may 
result in certain shareholders obtaining control disproportionate to the equity ownership. 
Among the recommendations that the Report suggested to be made mandatory for the companies to 
follow, the prominent ones deserving mention include that data like quarterly outcomes, 
introduction made by organizations to investigators etc. ought to be displayed on the organization's 
official website or be sent in such a shape to the Stock Exchange on which the shares of the 
company are listed, so that the Exchange can put it up on its own website.20 One of the significant 
non-mandatory suggestions made by the Report involves sending to every family unit of investors a 
statement of the performance of the company on the financial front including any other significant 
activity at least once every six months.21
The report states that an organization must have suitable frameworks set up which will empower the 
investors to take an interest in the corporate activities successfully and vote in the investors' 
19 Ibid, para 14.1.
20 Ibid, para 14.7.
21Ibid, para 14.8..
Commented [p1]:  I am not exactly sure what this sentence 
intends to convey. Should it be This relationship requires the Board 
and the administration to be ultimately responsible and accountable 
to the shareholders of the company?
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meetings. The organization ought to likewise keep the investors educated of the guidelines and 
voting techniques, which administer the general investor meetings.22 As indicated by paragraph 
14.10 of the Report, the annual general meeting of the organization ought not ever be purposely 
held in a manner that would render it difficult for most of the investors to participate in. The 
organization should likewise guarantee that the voting process is not so arranged as to make it 
difficult or expensive for the investors to make their choice.23
The Report goes on to recommend in paragraph 14.11 providing postal ballots for key decisions to 
shareholders who are unable to attend the meetings, with a detailed list of the matters which should 
require postal ballot being laid down in Annexure 324 of the Report. Under paragraph 14.12, the 
Committee put forth a mandatory recommendation that a Board committee under the chairmanship 
of a non-executive director should be formed to specifically look into the redressing of shareholder 
complaints like transfer of shares, non-receipt of balance sheet, non-receipt of declared dividends 
etc. Such a suggestion was given, as it was believed that the formation of such a committee will 
help focus the attention of the company on shareholders grievances and sensitise the management 
to address the same in an expedited manner. Paragraph 14.13 lays down a mandatory 
recommendation that to expedite the process of share transfers, the Board of the company should 
delegate the power of share transfer to an officer, or a committee or to the registrar and share 
transfer agents, with such delegated authority attending to share transfer formalities at least once in 
a fortnight.
Paragraphs 14.14 to 14.16 of the Report mention about the concept of institutional shareholders. 
According to paragraph 14.14, for instance, as such shareholders have obtained significant stakes in 
the equity share capital of listed Indian companies, they have or are going to be majority 
shareholders in many listed companies and possess shares to a great extent; hence in such capacity, 
they have a greater duty given the weightage of their votes and have a greater part to play in 
corporate governance as smaller retail investors rely upon such institutional shareholder for positive 
utilization of their voting rights for the benefit of the company as a whole. The Report thereafter 
advances along these lines that given the importance of their votes, the institutional shareholders 
22    Paragraph 14.9 of the Report states that a company must have appropriate systems in place which will enable the 
shareholders to participate effectively and vote in the shareholders meetings. The company should also keep the 
shareholders informed of the rules and voting procedures, which govern the general shareholder meetings
23  Paragraph 14.10 of the Report provides that the annual general meetings of the company should not be deliberately 
held at venues or the timing should not be such which makes it difficult for most of the shareholders to attend. The 
company must also ensure that it is not inconvenient or expensive for shareholders to cast their vote.
24 It mentions the post ballot system in detail including the rationale, items requiring voting by postal ballot and 
procedure for the postal ballot. 
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can and ought to adequately utilize their power to further the causes of corporate governance. 
Practices elsewhere in the world have shown that the aggregate stake of the institutional 
shareholders can indeed prove to be a power to reckon with in this context; together they can 
influence the company to provide the guarantee that it will in turn focus on matters relating to 
effective implementation of the corporate governance code with a specific end goal to boost 
shareholder value. What is essential in the perspective of the Committee is that, the institutional 
shareholders voting power must be put to great usage.25 
2. Naresh Chandra Committee, 2002
The Department of Company Affairs set up on 21 August, 2002 the Naresh Chandra Committee to 
examine various issues related to corporate governance. Given the limited attention paid by the 
Committee to the aspects of shareholder rights and allied issues, the Report submitted by it is of 
mere peripheral significance in the context of this paper. The relevance that it does bear stems from 
paragraph 2.5 of the Report, which the later Narayana Murthy Committee Report referred to and 
used as a basis for its subsequent recommendations on shareholder rights. The said paragraph 
specifically addresses the issue of disclosure of contingent liabilities and proposes that the 
management ought to give a clear description in plain English language of every material 
contingent liability and its risks; further, this ought to be supplemented by the auditors clearly 
worded comments on such views as expressed by the administration. The segment ought to be 
highlighted in the significant accounting policies and notes on accounts, as well as in the auditors 
report, wheresoever deemed essential. This is critical in the light of the fact that investors and 
shareholders ought to get a clear and accurate picture of an organization's contingent liabilities, as 
these might be noteworthy risk figures that could unfavourably influence the company's future 
monetary condition and after-effects of operations. 
3. Narayana Murthy Committee, 2003
Under the chairmanship of N. R. Narayana Murthy, the Chairman and Chief Mentor of Infosys 
Technologies Limited, SEBI subsequently constituted a committee to assess the prevailing 
corporate governance norms and to enhance and strengthen such practices in keeping with the 
advancement of the market economy as a whole. The Committee met thrice on December 7, 2002, 
25 Birla Committee Report para 14.16.
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January 7, 2003 and February 8, 2003, to discuss the issues related to corporate governance and 
eventually presented its recommendations to SEBI. 
The terms of reference of the Committee are set out as under: 
T To audit the execution of corporate governance; and 
T To decide the part of companies in reacting to talk and other value sensitive data flowing the 
market, so as to upgrade the integrity and transparency of the market.
The rights of the shareholders have been dealt by the committee under various heads. Under Risk 
Management, mentioned in part 3.5 of the Committees report, reference has been made to Board 
disclosures, with the Committee emphasising the importance for the Board to be completely 
mindful of the dangers confronting the business, as well for the investors to think about the 
procedure by which the company chooses to deal with the various obstacles on its path.26
In this context, the Committee did look into another useful concept, viz. nominee directors, 
excluding them in part 3.8 of the Report from the ambit of the definition of independent directors.27 
The Committee felt that the institution of nominee directors presents a situation that sound 
corporate governance practices ought  to maintain a strategic distance from. Such directors regularly 
assert that they are liable just to the shareholders who have nominated them and assume no liability 
for the organization's administration or trustee obligation to different investors. It is vital that all 
executives, in the case of speaking to organizations or something else, ought to have similar duties 
and liabilities.28 The Report also states that in the case of appointment of a nominee on the Board, 
the normal process of election by shareholders must be adopted.29 As a mandatory recommendation, 
the Report suggests that there may be no one chosen nominee; rather where a foundation wishes to 
choose a director on the Board, such arrangement ought to be made by the investors. An 
institutional executive, so selected, should have similar obligations and might be liable to 
26 Part 3.5.1.1: The Committee believes that it is important for corporate Boards to be fully aware of the risks facing the 
business and that it is important for shareholders to know about the process by which companies manage their 
business risks
27 Part 3.8.1: Exclusion of nominee directors from the definition of independent directors    
28 Part 3.8.1.2: The Committee felt that the institution of nominee directors creates a conflict of interest that should be 
avoided. Such directors often claim that they are answerable only to the institutions they represent and take no 
responsibility for the companys management or fiduciary responsibility to other shareholders. It is necessary that 
all directors, whether representing institutions or otherwise, should have the same responsibilities and liabilities
29 The Report of Shri N R Narayana Murthy Committee on Corporate Governance 2003, available at:  
<https://www.sebi.gov.in/reports/reports/mar-2003/the-report-of-shri-n-r-narayana-murthy-committee-on-corporate-
governance-for-public-comments-_12986.html> 
Part 3.8.1.3: If the institution, whether as a lending institution or as investing institution, wishes to appoint its nominee 
on the Board, such appointment should be made through the normal process of election by the shareholders
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indistinguishable liabilities from some other director. Nominee of the Government on public sector 
companies ought to be similarly elected and subjected to the same responsibilities and liabilities as 
other directors.30 Further, the Report recommends that all the compensation made to the non-
executive directors should be approved by the shareholders and may be fixed by the Board of 
directors.31
4. JJ Irani Expert Committee, 2005
Last but not the least comes the turn of a committee that had been constituted under the 
chairmanship of JJ Irani, Director of Tata Sons, on 2nd December, 2004 with the task of suggesting 
to the Government the proposed changes to the Comp nies Act, 1956. 
The rights of shareholders have been scattered across various parts in the report submitted by this 
Committee. While discussing the shifting of registered office of the company, which required such 
shift taking place from one state to another to be subject to the order of the Company Law Board, 
the Committee expressed its concern at the delays and costs involved in the process. A view was 
communicated that this choice ought to be left to the shareholders. In any case, the Committee 
additionally perceived that interests of stakeholders ought to be made a key consideration for the 
process, which in turn should be rendered on an urgent basis less complex, speedier and less 
demanding, without reference to a Tribunal/Court, thus guaranteeing that the new registered office 
is available to stakeholders for legitimate plan of action, as, when and where required.32
With regard to contentious issues such as the manner of appointment, removal and resignation of 
Directors, it was expressed that the ultimate decision to appoint/remove directors ought to be that of 
the company (in other words, that of the shareholders). On the off chance that the Directors 
themselves are legitimately precluded to hold directorships, they ought to have an equivalent duty 
regarding unveiling the reality and purposes behind their exclusion. Government ought not to 
mediate during the process of appointment and removal of Directors in non-Government 
30 Part 3.8.1.5: Mandatory recommendation: There shall be no nominee directors. Where an institution wishes to 
appoint a director on the Board, such appointment should be made by the shareholders. An institutional director, so 
appointed, shall have the same responsibilities and shall be subject to the same liabilities as any other director.
31 Part 3.9 Non-Executive Director Compensation: Part 3.9.1.2 forms a mandatory recommendation of The Report of 
Shri N R Narayana Murthy Committee on Corporate Governance, 2003.
32 Report on Company Law (JJ Irani Committee Report), available at:  
<http://www.primedirectors.com/pdf/JJ%20Irani%20Report-MCA.pdf> (accessed on 28 February 2017), 17. 
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companies. It was deemed essential that the powers of the Government, under the laws in vogue, to 
intercede in the appointment of Directors be reviewed and revised, vesting the responsibilities on 
the shareholders instead.
In the case of Directors remuneration, the Committee again felt that the issue had to be decided by 
the shareholders in the light of the prevailing circumstances within the company, including but not 
limited to its financial health. To enable proper decision-making in this regard, it was important to 
subject this aspect to a strong corporate governance mechanism on the basis of accurate and 
transparent disclosures. Therefore, the Committee felt that this decision need not be taken by the 
Government on behalf of the company, but should be left to its shareholders whose approval should 
necessarily be taken.33 Regarding disclosure requirements, as the shareholders in case of a scheme 
of merger/acquisition need to have complete data, p rticularly in relation to mergers proposed by 
the promoters, the Act/Rules ought to mandate providing explicit necessary disclosure requirements 
in the explanatory statements to be sent to the shareholders with regard to the plan documented 
under the watchful eye of the Courts/Tribunals.34
The Committee also acknowledged the additional need for administration of punishments 
comparable with the offense under the provisions of the Companies Act. Activities disregarding 
governance provisions in a way that deny the shareholders of their rights should be dealt with 
seriously. The Committee was of the view that all fraudulent conduct ought to be subjected to the 
stringent punishment, as should be deficient, wrong or false disclosures or activities that do not 
permit shareholder democracy or a focused market for corporate control to work. On the other hand, 
infringement of a procedural sort that does not irreversibly harm stakeholders rights should be dealt 
with in a different way as per the Committees suggestions.35 
Finally, while discussing the subject of lifting of the corporate veil, the Committee opined that 
under certain circumstance, notwithstanding the provisions of the company law firmly putting the 
associated responsibility and the risk on the Board and the officers in default, it might still be 
possible for the promoters of controlling interests to act in derogation of the spirit of the law while 
adhering to its letter. Where fraudulent action has been discovered regardless of statutory 
prohibitions, the law ought to accommodate lifting the corporate veil to identify such promoters or 
33 ibid 27.
34 ibid 79.
35 ibid 85.
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shareholders who are the later ego behind the corporate behemoth and determine whether they can 
be held liable for said action and if so, to what extent. As the Committee suggested, there ought to 
be a framework of punishments and sanctions laid down for catering to such situations.36
While the reports submitted by all the aforementioned committees did play a significant role in the 
evolution of corporate governance within the Indian legal sector, by no means was such evolution 
confined only within the recommendations made by such reports and the treatment meted out to 
them by the government, as will be illustrated in the next part of this paper.
IV. EVOLUTION OF THE LEGAL REGIME ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
To understand paradigm shifts in Indian corporate governance, one needs to construe the issue in 
terms of specific questions and how they have transformed across time  the authors have focused 
on some of the variables from Appendix A, which have been studied in course of this research and 
taken a more in-depth look at their manner of evolution and contribution to the Indian corporate 
governance scenario, including the manner in which the leading applicable legislations have sought 
to incorporate such variables within their ambit. 
IV.A Transfer of Shares
Transfer of shares comprises one such example. The Companies Act, 1956 freely allowed such 
transfer of shares, with Section 111 contemplating the power of the Board of directors to refuse 
registration of such transfer. A bare reading of the provisions may not reveal much. All cl (1) of 
said Section says is that in case of refusal, a notice has to be issued within two months to the parties 
involved in the transaction; cl (2) provides for appeal, and so forth. Several judgments have 
reiterated that the Board of directors enjoys no discretion to refuse any transfer unless the articles of 
association sanction such refusal, that is, they confer on the Board the power to refuse transfer.37 On 
occasion, courts have even struck down what they considered refusal beyond the Boards 
competence.38 
36 ibid 91.
37 See e.g. the Karnataka High Court decision in Naveen Kumar v. Karnataka Theatres All India Reporter (AIR) 1999 
Karnataka 71.
38 Ibid. 
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In cases such as State of Orissa v. Indian Chemical Products,39 courts have reiterated that even if 
the power has been provided for in the articles of association, it must be exercised by the Board in a 
bona fide manner. (The Indian Chemicals case is interesting for other reasons as well, since it is on 
this occasion that the court found that the articles of association did not expressly authorise refusal. 
Yet after looking at provisions of the Companies Act, 1913 (which applied to the present case),40 it 
concluded that the Act, read with the companys articles of association, did in fact confer on the 
Board the power to refuse. However, the court then concluded that the power had not been 
exercised in a bona fide manner, and was therefore bad in law.) The Madras High Court41 held in 
the context of the 1913 Act that even if the Board is authorised to refuse transfer, it cannot exercise 
its power for reasons that do not pertain to the transferee personally. Similarly, it was held that the 
Board cannot exercise its powers of refusal merely on the basis of the opinion of a prominent 
shareholder who is opposed to the transfer.42 On the other hand, it has been made clear that the 
Board is not bound to provide reasons for its refusal;43 and that the possibility that the transferees 
character was such as would throw the company into confusion was a valid reason.44 
In addition, the Supreme Courts ruling in the leading case of Bajaj Auto v. NK Firodia 45 must be 
examined in some detail. It began by stating:46 
Discretion implies just and proper consideration of the proposal in the facts and 
circumstances of the case. In the exercise of that discretion the Directors will act for the 
paramount interest of the company and for the general interest of the shareholders because 
the Directors are in a fiduciary position both towards the company and towards every 
shareholder. The Directors are therefore required to act bona fide and not arbitrarily and not 
for any collateral motive.
Following the aforementioned pronouncement, the Supreme Court then proceeded to lay down a 
threefold test to determine when refusal is legitimate, basing on the following considerations: First, 
whether the Directors acted in the interest of the company; secondly, whether they acted on a wrong 
39 AIR 1956 Orissa 203.
40 Section 18 of the 1913 Companies Act read with Table A of Schedule 1.
41 The Coimbatore Kamala Mills v. T Sundaram AIR 1950 Madras 725.
42 TH Condon and A Butterworth v. The Muir Mills Company, Limited of Cawnpore (1900) 22 All 410. The 
Allahabad High Court even termed such refusal a breach of fibiduciary discretion.
43 Thenappa Chettiar v. Indian Overseas Bank AIR 1943 Madras 743.
44 Muthappa Chettiar v. Salem Rajendra Mills AIR 1955 Mad 665.
45 AIR 1971 Supreme Court 321.
46 Ibid, para 13.
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principle; and, thirdly, whether they acted with an oblique motive or for a collateral purpose47 
(emphasis added). However, it also clarified that this position will not authorise courts to what 
effectively amounts to micro-managing each instance of refusal: if a court finds that a Board has 
provided valid reasons for refusing transfer, it cannot intervene merely on grounds that the court 
itself might have come to different conclusions.48
Section 111A was added to the Companies Act courtesy the Depositories Act, 1996. It expressly 
provides (cl (2)) that subject to the provisions of the section, the shares or debentures and any 
interest therein of a company shall be freely transferable. It also empowers tribunals to make 
enquiries and then, if necessary, direct depositories and companies to rectify records of transfer. It 
treats transfer as a right of the shareholder, which can be inferred from its injunction in cl (5) that 
the provisions of this section shall not affect shareholders rights to transfer shares. Once again, this 
must be understood in the light of judicial rulings. The Calcutta High Court chose to interpret this 
as not permitting public companies to refuse registration on grounds of limitation, since that was 
never the intention of the Legislature.49 A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court also ruled that 
Section 111A is not in the nature of a self-contained code, and that there is nothing in the provision 
that takes away a members common law right to seek rectification.50
In Companies Act, 2013, issues relating to free transfer of shares are addressed in Section 58.51 
Clause (1) specifies that if a private company, whether in pursuance of any power of the company 
under its articles or otherwise (emphasis added) refuses to either transfer shares or transmit them 
by operation of law, it shall accordingly notify the persons concerned. Clause (2) states that 
securities and other interests in a company are freely transferable and also, as the proviso to the 
clause states, enforceable as a contract (emphasis added). However, these are to apply without 
prejudice to cl (1). This suggests an interesting legal situation, where the liberty to transfer shares 
functions parallel with (and for all practical purposes stands effectively subject to) any discretion 
that the Board may derive from its articles or otherwise. One may recall that decisions like Naveen 
Kumar had noted in respect of the 1956 Act that the power to refuse transfer needs to flow from the 
companys articles of association. Section 58(1) of the new 2013 Act opens the possibility of such 
47 Ibid, para 15.
48 Ibid, para 22.
49 Peerless General Finance v. Poddar Projects Ltd 2005 Calcutta Weekly Notes 1005.
50 2002 (35) SEBI & Corporate Laws 27.
51 The 57th Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee describes this provision as corresponding to Ss. 111(1) 
and 111(2) of the old Act. See 57th Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on the Companies Bill 2011, 
761.
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power being derived from other sources too. 
Section 58 owes much to the 57th Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on the 
Companies Bill, 2011.52 The Report states inter alia that the provision simply seeks to codify the 
pronouncements made by various Courts in regard to transferability of shares, and making 
enforceable contracts pertaining to share transfer. Judicial pronouncements also appears to endorse 
this view. The Bombay High Court in Bajaj Auto v. Western Maharashtra Development 
Corporation53 held that it merely restates in systematic terms the existing law on pre-emption 
agreements: In other words, what was implicit in the provisions of section 111A of the Companies 
Act, 1956 has now been made explicit in section 58 of the Companies Act, 2013. 
Section 59 of the 2013 Act is similar in its language to Section 111A of the old Act.54 The Mumbai 
Bench of the Company Law Board had occasion in Neptune Overseas v. National Multi Commodity 
Exchange55 to examine the relation between the two. It acknowledged that the provision is akin to 
Section 155/111 [sic 111A?] of the 1956 Act and Section 38 of the 1913 Act.56 And for this reason, 
Section 59 can well sustain an appeal in respect of a cause of action that arose when the 1956 Act 
was in force.57 This would appear to treat the two provisions as in substance in pari materia in 
respect of one another. 
IV.B Annual Reports
Another issue pertains to whether annual reports are to be regularly sent to shareholders and a 
central registry. The law remains largely unchanged on this point from 1913 onwards. Section 
219(1) of the 1956 Act mandated that copies of annual reports be sent to each member at least 
twenty-one days prior to any general meeting where the report is to be presented. Clause (2) 
extended to members, debenture-holders, and depositors the right to obtain balance sheets, profit 
and loss accounts, and so forth. In Re Murarka Paint and Varnish Works,58 decided in the context 
of the 1913 Act, the Court held that copies of documents to which only members are entitled to, 
cannot be given to non-members, nor even to individuals whose names have been struck off the 
52 Ibid, 104. (Incidentally, Bajaj Auto (in paragraph 39) attributes the statement to page 86 of the Report.)
53 2015 (4) Arbitration Law Reporter 470 (Bom), para 40.
54 The 57th Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee (p 761) describes this provision as correspond(ing) to 
section 111A of the Companies Act, 1956.
55 Manupatra citation MANU/CL/0080/2014.
56 Ibid, para 24.
57 Ibid, para 18.
58 (1948) 52 Calcutta Weekly Notes 590.
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register of members and who are in the process of challenging such removal. Section 136 of the 
2013 Act expands the scope of the provision to span a range of documents including financial 
statements, consolidated financial statements, auditors reports, and every other document required 
by law to be annexed or attached to the financial statements; and also a range of recipients 
extending to members, trustees for debenture holders, and other entitled persons.
IV.C Interested Directors
The issue of interested directors is one that is surely fundamental to corporate governance. Section 
297 of the 1956 Act specified that only with the Boards sanction could a company enter into 
certain specified transactions with a director of the company or her relative; or firms or companies 
where a director or her relative was a partner or member or director. Cl (3) made an exception for 
urgent circumstances; cl (4) specified the procedure for obtaining the boards consent; and cl (5) 
made unauthorised transactions voidable at the option of the board. Section 299(1) of the 1956 Act 
also required directors directly or indirectly concerned or interested in any transaction to disclose 
the nature of this concern or interest. Section 300(1) of the 1956 Act forbade directors from voting, 
or even participating in discussions related to, contracts or transactions in which he was directly or 
indirectly interested. It also specified that the presence of such a director shall not be included for 
determining if a quorum exists, and if a director did vote in violation of the foregoing, the vote 
stood voided. Section 301 of the 1956 Act required a register to be maintained where particulars of 
all interested party transactions were to be recorded. That the legislation intended the provisions to 
cover a wide ambit is clear from the wording employed, and yet certain vital issues were left 
unresolved. For instance, terms like concern and interest were not defined either in the above 
provisions or in the definitions clause. 
The 2013 Act, however, approaches the matter more systematically. It introduces a new concept 
termed related party transactions. Section 2(76) defines related party in terms of directors; key 
managerial personnel; their relatives; firms and companies in which they or their relatives are 
involved as partners, directors, members and so forth; and even persons on whose advice a director 
or manager is accustomed to act. Section 184 requires directors to reveal at the beginning of each 
year all the firms and companies in which they are interested, and also their interest in any company 
with which the board intends to enter into transactions. It is broadly analogous to Section 299 of the 
old Act, but is much more precise in its wording. For example, cl 2(a) requires directors to reveal in 
certain circumstances their interest in companies in which they hold more than 2% of the shares, or 
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of which they are promoters, managers, or CEOs. Interestingly, cl (1) uses the phrase concern or 
interest, which suggests that the two notions, namely concern or interest and related party are to 
operate in parallel spheres, and that the second is not intended to replace the first.
Section 188(1) specifies transactions that a company may enter into with a related party except 
through the Boards consent. Cl (2) requires related party transactions and their justifications to be 
mentioned in the boards report to shareholders. Clause (3), in the same manner as Section 297(5) 
of the 1956 Act, makes unauthorised transactions voidable at the option of the board, and adds that 
if circumstances so require, the concerned directors shall indemnify the company against any loss. 
According to cl (4), the company may, without prejudice to anything contained in cl (3), seek 
damages from the person responsible for the transaction in question. Cl (5) prescribes penal 
liabilities in respect of unauthorised related party transactions. 
IV.D Whistleblowers
One area where the 2013 Act instantiates a radical departure from the 1956 legal position is in 
respect of whistleblowers. The older legislation carries no mention of any such notion. The 57th 
Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee records a suggestion to incorporate provisions 
relating to whistleblowing, and specifically to the legal protection of whistleblowers.59 The Ministry 
of Corporate Affairs responded by stating that provisions relating to vigil mechanisms, as they 
termed it, had already been incorporated in cls 177(9) and (10) of the 2011 Bill.60 Gurudas 
Dasguptas dissenting note, however, contends that the Bill fails to address squarely issues of 
corporate delinquency, and that Whistle-blowers, who expose such acts, should be protected by 
law. From this, one may infer Dasgupta found extant provisions inadequate.61 Be that as it may, the 
Statement of Objects and Reasons presented in the Report does assert that the Committees 
revisions to the 2009 Bill includes moves towards enhanced accountability on the part of 
companies, specifically provisions in respect of vigil mechanism (whistle blowing) proposed to 
enable a company to evolve a process to encourage ethical corporate behaviour, while rewarding 
employees for their integrity and for providing valuable information to the management on deviant 
practices. (emphasis added)62 The word enable suggests an intention to make the matter only 
optional at desire of the company, which appears to lend credence to Dasguptas apprehensions.
59 57th Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on the Companies Bill 2011, 78.
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid 121. 
62 Ibid 746. 
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The 2013 Act partially substantiates these apprehensions. Section 177(9) mandates compulsorily the 
establishment of a vigil mechanism for directors and employees to report genuine concerns. This 
is followed by the phrase in such manner as may be prescribed. But does this phrase qualify the 
establishment of mechanisms or the reporting of concerns? Some ambiguity exists on this count, 
though the latter does appear more likely. Cl (10) does not prescribe the manner in which the 
mechanism is to be establishes. It merely specifies that such mechanism must be adequate, and 
provide for direct access to the chairperson of the Audit Committee in appropriate or exceptional 
cases. It also requires companies to specify on their respective websites and in the boards report 
details of the mechanism chosen.
IV.E Corporate Social Responsibility
The 2013 Act is notable also for its handling of CSR, or corporate social responsibility. Section 135 
not only accords statutory recognition to the concept, but also makes it obligatory for companies 
above a certain size to devote at least 2% of its net profits for this purpose. Cl (1) lays down several 
criteria for determining inclusion into this category: they include a net worth of five billion Rupees; 
a turnover of ten billion Rupees; or a net profit of fifty million Rupees within a financial year. 
Commentators have pointed out that these threshold values create a sharp discontinuity, since a 
minor change in net income leads to a discrete change (i.e., a discontinuity) in the application of 
CSR rule.63 
The reason for referring to Section 135 is that this provision carries some bearing on the issue of 
corporate governance. It requires companies to constitute a Corporate Social Responsibility 
Committee comprising of three or more directors, at least one of whom is to be an independent one. 
This committee is required to formulate and implement a CSR policy for the company, specifying 
the activities the latter is to undertake. (Sch VII enumerates activities that a company may 
legitimately pursue in this regard: instances include eradicating hunger and poverty; promoting 
education; gender equality and womens empowerment, and so forth.) Clause (5) confers the 
committee the responsibility to ensure the company spends on CSR at least 2% of its net profits; it 
also specifies that if the company fails to do so, the Board shall in its report under S 134 (3)(o) 
specify reasons for this failure. 
63 See Hariom Manchiraju, Shivaram Rajgopal, Does Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Create Shareholder 
Value? Evidence from the Indian Companies Act 2013 (2017) 55 Journal of Accounting Research 1257, 1259.
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It is too early to say if this kind of legislative mandate will prove to be effective in the long run. 
Case-law on the area is rather scant till date. In Tata Power Company v. Maharashtra Electricity 
Regulatory State Commission,64 the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (New Delhi) held that the 
appellant company could not pass CSR expenses onto consumers, since that would amount to the 
consumers effectively sustaining the companys own social obligations. (Incidentally, though the 
appellants explicitly invoked S. 135 of the 2013 Act, the issue here related to expenses incurred in 
the years 2009-10 and 2010-11.) 
Secondary literature on the issue yields a diverse range of conclusions. Manchiraju and Rajgopal 
referred to earlier conclude that mandatory CSR does not enhance shareholder value, but instead 
has the effect of burdening the company at the expense of shareholders.65 Kansal, Joshi and Batra 
observed that on the whole, CSR declarations by Indian companies tended towards the low.66 
Khan, Muttakin and Siddiquis study of corporate governance and CSR disclosures (although 
originally carried out in the context of the neighbouring Bangladesh) yields interesting conclusions: 
High ownership concentration by managers (such as in family-owned companies, extremely 
common in India as in Bangladesh) leads to a diminished involvement in social activities, and hence 
a diminution in CSR disclosures as well. However, this does not hold true for export-oriented 
concerns, even family-owned ones, which tend to make significantly more CSR disclosures. 
Further, measures such as independent directors have a beneficial effect on CSR disclosures: It 
appears that despite the traditional settings, corporate governance mechanisms involving presence 
of outsiders have significant impact on the extent of disclosures made by Bangladeshi companies, 
possibly due to the legitimisation effects of such mechanisms.67 Mishra and Suar conclude 
emphatically: A favuorable CSR towards customers enhances firm profitability and NFP (i.e. non-
financial performance).68 
While the legislative focus on this part of the paper does reveal the degree and extent of evolution 
of corporate governance norms in India, one still needs to look at the quantitative aspect in order to 
gauge the extent to which such norms have had any measurable impact in the Indian corporate 
64 Manupatra citation MANU/ET/0150/2013.
65 Manchiraju, Rajgopal (n 57), 1296.
66 Monika Kansal, Mahesh Joshi, Gurdip Singh Batra, Determinants of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures: 
Evidence from India (2014) 30 Advances in Accounting 217.
67 Arifur Khan, Mohammad Badrul Muttakin, Javed Siddiqui, Corporate Governance and Corporate Social 
Responsibility Disclosures: Evidence from an Emerging Economy (2013) 114 Journal of Business Ethics 207, 220.
68 Supriti Mishra, Damodar Suar, Does Corporate Social Responsibility Influence Firm Performance of Indian 
Companies? (2010) 95 Journal of Business Ethics 571, 588.
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sector, something which will be discussed in the following part of this paper. 
V: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INDIA
The authors now present the quantitative aspects of the evolution of the corporate governance 
regulation in India to complement the qualitative discussion above.
The authors have found that the probability of regime shift in Indian corporate governance 
development is very low throughout the period studied, this is due to the steady change in the 
updating of the corporate governance process in India. There are two very minor crests of 
probability 0.32, in year 5 and year 15. This corresponds to the years 1999/2000 around when the 
Report of the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee on Corporate Governance (2000)69 was accepted 
along with the publication of the Draft Report of the Kumar Mangalam Committee on Corporate 
Governance (1999)70 and the Desirable Corporate Governance in India - A Code (1998) 71 and the 
years 2008/09 which came in the implementation phase of Clause 49 (adopted in 2005)72 and the 
publication of the Corporate Governance Voluntary Guidelines (2009).73 
69  SEBI, Report of the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee on Corporate Governance (2000) 
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/corpgov.pdf>
70  SEBI, Draft Report of the Kumar Mangalam Committee on Corporate Governance (1999) 
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/draft_report.pdf>
71  Desirable Corporate Governance in India - A Code (1998) 
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/desirable_corporate_governance240902.pdf>
72  Clause 49, SEBI Listing Regulation <http://www.sebi.gov.in/commreport/clause49.html> 
<http://indianboards.com/files/clause_49.pdf>
73  Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India, Corporate Governance Voluntary Guidelines (2009) 
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cg_voluntary_guidelines_2009_india_24dec2009_en.pdf>
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Similarly for the financial market index, the authors have found the following change-points.
The probability of a change point in the financial market development in India is highest for year 10 
(probability of 0.61). This corresponds to the year 2005, which in turn corresponds with the time 
period of rapid financial growth, especially between 2005 to 2008 when the rate of growth averaged 
over 9%.74 
VI: IMPACT OF CHANGE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON FINANCIAL MARKET GROWTH IN INDIA
74  Malayendu Saha, Indian Economy and Growth of Financial Market in the Contemporary Phase of Globalization 
Era (2012) 1 International Journal of Developing Societies 1-10.
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From the graph above, it can be summarised that corporate governance in India has shifted steadily 
towards a shareholder value model over the period of time studied under this research. The shift in 
corporate governance has coincided with growth in the financial market. However, the growth in 
the financial market also corresponds to economic (control 1) growth and an increase in R&D 
expenditure and high technology export (control 3). Prima facie control 1 and control 3 are more 
correlated to financial market development than change in corporate governance.
This is experimentally proven by the regression planes and scatter plot in the graphs above. 
However, the corporate governance regression coefficient for the Bayesian analysis differs 
significantly in comparison to frequentist analysis. The high density interval for the Bayesian 
analysis lies between 0.003676 and 0.120785, the frequentist coefficient of 0.140102 lies just 
beyond this area.
CG Control 1 Control 2 Control 3 Intercept
Mean Bayesian 0.062502 0.398711 0.057521 0.472082 -0.01918
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Frequentist 0.140102 0.342849 0.021449 0.541839 -0.16607
However, both the regression analyses show that the corporate governance regression coefficient is 
low in comparison to the mean control 1 and control 3 coefficient. Its impact is similar to control 2 
for Bayesian analysis and seven times larger in frequentist analysis. The frequentist analysis also 
predicts that the corporate governance change in India has the second highest impact on financial 
market growth among the countries studied under this research, while Bayesian analysis puts India 
at eighth among the nineteen developing countries studied in this research. Thus there is a need for 
further qualitative study to explore the reason behind this apparent dissociation between the results 
predicted by Bayesian and frequentist methods.
A ratio analysis shows the impact as following.
Mean Bayesian Frequentist
CG:Ctrl1 CG:Ctrl3 CG:Ctrl1 CG:Ctrl3
1 : 6.3792 1 : 7.5531 1 : 2.447 1 : 3.868
It can thus be concluded that although changes in the corporate governance model in India may 
have some impact (based on frequentist analysis) on the growth of the Indian financial market, it is 
still several times lower than control 1 and control 3.
VII: CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the authors would like to posit that the present study in the course of this paper, both 
via qualitative as well as quantitative methodology, has presented the fact that India shows a 
significant correlation between the changes in its corporate governance regulations and its financial 
market growth. Even controlling for the macroeconomic growth and technological growth, at least 
in Frequentist or classical method, laws have had an undeniably major role to play. In Bayesian 
analysis, the role of law is, however, more muted. The authors would thus tend to agree with the 
law matters group of legal scholars, at least in the view of this empirical research done in the 
context of Indian financial market growth.
 
The authors would hasten to add that there can of course be other hidden factors, which were not 
studied by this research, like enforcement, human development factors etc. The authors aim to add 
them to a multilevel model later. It is interesting to note that the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance 2015 have also emphasised the regulatory and implementation aspects of corporate 
governance. Further studies are needed to find out if India which had eagerly adopted the 
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shareholder primacy model espoused in the 2004 Principles, shows similar propensity towards 
strengthening the regulatory systems as encouraged in the 2015 Principles.
While it is difficult to exercise a radical influence on economic growth in a short space of time, it is 
much easier to have a significant impact on R&D investment and encourage technology based 
industries. The authors thus propose that in order to achieve sustainable growth in financial markets, 
developing countries should adopt policies encouraging R&D and focussing on high technology-led 
export industries. These policies could take the form of: favourable tax regulations for R&D 
investments; incentives for high technology industries through conducive regulatory mechanisms 
such as easier access to credit, simpler rules for doing business, fewer opportunities for regulatory 
arbitrage, single window clearance whereby businesses are allowed to submit regulatory documents 
to a single entity, tax credits etc.; and discouraging financial transactions which legitimise 
unproductive rent-seeking behaviour, for example by imposing higher tax rates on buy backs of 
shares, and rationalising capital gains tax rules, especially when they are being used as the primary 
avenue to seek returns on investment etc.75
75  See generally William Lazonick, Stock Buybacks: From retain and reinvest to downsize and distribute (2015) 
Working paper Centre for Effective public management at Brookings
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Appendix A
Corporate governance variables
Shareholder rights index
T Secure methods of ownership registration - 2 if a central depository is available and shares 
are mandatorily held in an electronic dematerialised format in the central depositories, 1 if 
there is a central depository but it is optional to have shares in dematerialised format, 0 if 
there is no central depository. 
The first step for a shareholder to claim these rights would be to prove himself a shareholder, with 
increasing cross-border holdings, registration often becomes the first hurdle. Thus a pro-shareholder 
corporate governance regime would insist on an easy process with dematerialised shares which 
allow for electronic transfer especially through a central clearing house to reduce frauds, transaction 
time etc.   
T Transfer of shares  2 if shares of listed/public companies which can be traded in the open 
market are fully transferable, 1 if there are restrictions at the discretion of companies and if a 
non-binding regulations call for full transferability of shares, 0 otherwise; 2 if foreign 
nationals are allowed to own and transfer shares and are treated on a par with the citizens of 
the host country, 1 if foreign nationals are allowed to own and transfer shares but with 
certain restrictions not placed on the citizens of the host country 0 if foreign nationals are 
not allowed to own or transfer shares.
The founding pillar of pro-shareholder corporate governance allows the shareholders a free choice 
to exit a company. Hence there is a need for an equity market, the shares need to be fully 
transferable and there should not be an onerous burden on the shareholder to transfer the shares. 
Some jurisdictions may have some restrictions on transfer such as a lock in period for promoters, 
restriction on preference shares, partially paid up equity shares etc. In the majority of such cases 
these non-transferable shares are not allowed to be traded on the open market (though sometimes 
trade is allowed in private markets). Therefore, to allow uniformity, only those shares which can be 
traded on the open market (like common equity shares) need to be fully transferable. Some 
jurisdictions place extra burden on foreign nationals and thus increase the cost of access to capital, a 
pro-shareholder policy would allow foreign funds entry to the financial market as it would give 
shareholders more choice and would lead to a more vibrant equity market.   
T Regular and timely information  2 if half yearly and annual reports are mandatorily sent to 
shareholders and a central registry, 1 if annual reports are sent to the central registry only 
and not to shareholders, 0 if no reports are sent or otherwise; 2 if it is statutorily mandated 
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that an annual report includes at least five of the following: a. balance sheet, b. profit and 
loss statement, c. cash flow statement, d. statement of changes in ownership equity, e. notes 
on the financial statements and f. an audit report, 1 if it is recommended under a non-binding 
code 0 if otherwise; 2 if financial reporting mandatorily is based on International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) and International Standards on Auditing (ISA) 1 if it is 
recommended under a non-binding code 0 if otherwise.
Timely and regular information is key in order to make an informed choice. Shareholders always 
suffer from an information gap, thus pro-shareholder corporate governance policies would always 
insist on higher burdens on companies to share the maximum possible financial reports on more 
than an annual basis. IFRS and ISA or comparable standards ensure that companies financial 
records comply with the globally accepted standards. This would allow easy comparisons across 
companies and help in shareholder choice. 
T Participate in shareholders meetings  2 if the law explicitly mandates that any class of 
shareholders are allowed to attend the meeting and take part in discussion, 1 if it is a 
common practice backed by a non-binding code 0 otherwise; 2 if a law mandates that a 
proxy form to vote on the items on the agenda accompanies notice of the meeting or if 
shareholders may vote by mail on the items on the agenda, 1 if it is recommended by a non-
binding code or is a general practice, 0 if under law/non-binding regulation/practice absent 
shareholders vote (or shareholders who have not returned the proxy form/postal ballot) is 
given to mangers by default; 2 if cross-border proxy voting is allowed without any 
restriction, 1 if it is allowed with some restriction or a non-binding governance code 
recommends cross-border proxy voting without restriction, 0 otherwise.
Although some classes of shareholders like those holding preference shares are barred from voting, 
a policy which allows them to participate in the meeting (without voting) is more shareholder-
friendly than regulations which completely bar the participation of nonvoting shareholders from 
general meetings. Further, in many highly dispersed companies it is not possible for the shareholder 
to attend the meetings and personally cast votes and proxies are generally used. A system which 
recognises shareholders as owners of the company would try to make it easier for more shareholder 
participation rather than using regulatory loopholes. A further mark of a liberalised regime would 
be to allow foreign nationals to use proxies to cast their votes as it otherwise might be financially 
onerous on the foreign shareholder.  
T Dividend  2 if shareholders can approve the amount of dividend to be paid with a simple 
majority, 1 if it is recommended under a non-binding regulation or code, 0 otherwise; 
Shareholder primacy corporate governance ensures shareholder wealth maximisation, timely 
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and appropriate dividends is one way. In many common law jurisdictions the board of 
directors decides the amount of dividend to be paid. Thus, shareholder approval by simple 
majority on the amount of dividend paid would ensure that shareholders have an indirect say 
on the amount of dividend rather than a situation where the board can itself decide and 
approve the dividend amount. 
T Supermajority for extraordinary transaction  2 each if it is mandated by rule or statute that 
75% or more shareholders need to agree for the following authorizing a) capital increases; b) 
waiving pre-emptive rights; c) buying back shares; d) amending articles of association; e) 
delisting; f) acquisitions, disposals, mergers and takeovers; g) changes to company business 
or objectives; h) making loans and investments beyond limits prescribed under prospectus; 
i) authorizing the board to: (i) sell or lease major assets; (ii) borrow money in excess of 
paid-up capital and free reserves, and (iii) appoint sole selling agents and apply to the court 
for the winding up of the company, 1 each if it is under a non-binding regulation with a 
comply or explain architecture or if it is a common practice, 0 otherwise.
Shareholders should retain control over the board in the case of an extraordinary transaction which 
may affect the long term and short term viability and profitability of the company. Buy back of 
shares, issuance of new shares and corporate restructuring generally lead to changes in the total paid 
up share capital and directly impacts on share prices. Capital restructuring can also lead to the 
consolidation of incumbent management in a widely held company. This provision can be misused 
by majority shareholders who can issue new shares to themselves, waiving the pre-emptive rights of 
first refusal of the minority, this leads to further dilution of minority held shares. Moreover, with an 
increased number of shares the price of shares would generally fall thereby expropriating the share 
value of the minority. Similarly, significant changes to the asset base of the company would also 
impact on the prices of shares. Rights issues can also be used as a takeover defence. Some 
jurisdictions allow for some of these powers to be exercised directly by the board, some require a 
simple majority while others demand a supermajority. If a supermajority is required for these 
transactions, shareholders are able to get full ex-ante information about aspects limiting their rights 
that would normally be factored into the price of the security. This limitation on absolute board 
power would also enable minority shareholders to protect themselves from self-dealing corporate 
insider expropriation by dilution, to an extent.
Anti-Managerial rights index
T Performance related pay - 2 if under law a minimum fixed portion of executive 
remuneration is performance linked, 1 if it is a common practice or recommended under a 
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non-binding corporate governance code, 0 otherwise; 2 if executive remuneration requires 
shareholder approval, 1 if shareholder approval is only advisory, 0 otherwise; 2 if there are 
statutory rules relating to stock option plans and stock linked pension funds exist, 1 if there 
is a non-binding code or regulation, 0 otherwise.
One of the cornerstones of agency-based shareholder value maximisation of corporate governance 
is to align the interests of the managers and the employees to the interest of the shareholders i.e. to 
increase the price of shares on equity markets. This can be achieved if emphasis is placed on 
encouraging executives to take a major portion of their remuneration in stock options. Like the 
OECD principles of corporate governance which states that performance related pay should be 
allowed to develop, most jurisdictions do not put in a fixed line as to how much executive 
compensation should be linked to the performance of share prices. However, a jurisdiction which 
wants to implement a performance-linked pay for executives will fix a minimum amount of 
compensation which must be linked to share performance. Similarly for employees there can be 
stock-linked pension funds or employees stock ownership plans (ESOPs). In many jurisdictions 
these exist as general practice, however as it becomes more prevalent legislators tend to regulate it 
by bringing rules. Thus the presence of guiding rules relating to ESOPs etc. acts as a proxy for the 
fact that performance related pay for employees has been generally accepted. Executive 
compensation is usually fixed by the remuneration committee, however, if shareholders need to 
approve the quantum of compensation, it adds another layer of shareholder control over the 
directors.
T Proportionality of ownership of share and control  2 if ordinary equity shares that do not 
carry a preference of any kind, neither for dividends nor for liquidation carry one vote per 
share,76 1 when a non-binding code discourages the existence of methods of disproportional 
control like multiple-voting and nonvoting ordinary shares, pyramid schemes or does not 
allow firms to set a maximum number of votes per shareholder irrespective of the number of 
shares owned, 0 otherwise
Each shareholder should be given proportional equity control to the amount invested. However over 
the years, due to financial requirements, various forms of shares have evolved  preference shares 
which have higher or fixed cash flow rights but sacrifice voting rights, golden shares which may 
contribute little to equity but have disproportionate voting rights etc.77 which are separate from 
76  Even with a strict imposition of one share one vote rule, which should in theory nullify golden shares, there would 
be other ways like stock pyramids, cross-ownership structures and dual class equity structures which gives 
disproportional control delinked from cash flow rights by careful manipulation of common equity shares.
77  See generally Milton Harris and Artur Raviv, Corporate governance: Voting rights and majority rules (1988) 20 
Journal of Financial Economics 203-235
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ordinary equity shares. The survey will limit itself to one vote per one ordinary share to ensure 
proportionality of control across the ordinary equity class. Thus, for example, a jurisdiction which 
does not have any regulation on disproportionate voting rights like golden shares, pyramid schemes 
etc. would be scored 0. 
T Markets for corporate control -  2 if pre-offer takeover defences are statutorily banned, 1 if 
there is a non-binding code which specifically discourages directors from using pre-offer 
defences, 0 if there is no regulation; 2 if post-offer takeover defences are statutorily banned, 
1 if there is a non-binding code which discourages directors from using post-offer defences, 
0 if there is no regulation; 2 if at least 25% or more shares are to be with the public for listed 
companies, 1 if there is a non-binding code for the same, 0 otherwise; 2 if a declaration to 
the market by a shareholder holding 5% of share capital is necessary whenever their 
shareholding changes by more than 1-5% of the total subscribed share capital within a given 
period of time, 1 if the disclosure is recommended by a non-binding code, 0 otherwise; 
To ensure that the market for corporate control can function effectively, any pro-shareholder 
corporate governance would try to restrict the powers of the incumbent managers to scupper 
takeover attempts. Takeover defences can be divided into two categories based on the time when 
they can be effected. Defences like the poison pill, automatic rights issue, golden parachute for 
executives, staggered board etc. are arranged before a bid is made for the control of the company. 
On the other hand, defences like targeted repurchase bids (coupled with white knight etc.), asset 
restructuring (crown jewel defence, scorched earth policy etc.), capital restructuring (issue of new 
shares to existing shareholders), greenmailing are usually set in motion once the takeover bid has 
already been made. Poison pills provide their holders with special rights in the case of a triggering 
event such as a hostile takeover bid. If a deal is approved by the board of directors, the poison pill 
can be revoked, but if the deal is not approved and the bidder proceeds, the pill is triggered. 
Similarly, golden parachutes are severance agreements that provide cash and non-cash 
compensation to senior executives upon an event such as termination, demotion, or resignation 
following a change in control.78 Rights issue (either contingent on takeover bid or post bid effected 
78  Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii and Andrew Metrick, Corporate governance and equity price (2003) 118 (1) Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 107 working paper available at < http://www.boardoptions.com/governancearticle.pdf>. In 
their seminal paper they studied 24 firm level corporate governance factors for 1500 large corporations for the 
period 1990-1999. The corporate governance provisions were divided into five thematic groups: tactics for delaying 
hostile bidders, director/officer protection, voting rights, other takeover defences, and State/laws.  Paul A. Gompers 
et al. focussed on anti-shareholder provisions in the companys prospectus and other documents creating a G 
index where higher scores meant lower shareholder rights. They then concentrated on two extreme ends of the 
index creating a Dictatorship Portfolio of the firms with the weakest shareholder rights EY"#& and a Democracy 
Portfolio of the firms with the strongest shareholder rights (G Z 5).  
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by incumbent management) allows for the issue of new shares to existing shareholders, this would 
lead to an increase in the number of shares and make it expensive for the raider to get majority 
control. As detailed in several pieces of research, takeover defences affect share prices and 
earnings.79 Thus, an ideal shareholder primacy corporate governance system would discourage 
takeover defences. It is also necessary to differentiate between pre-bid and post-bid defences as 
many jurisdictions allow some form of defence such as counter offers etc. which usually raises the 
share prices and thus offers a better exit to shareholders. Therefore, if a jurisdiction bans the 
incumbent management from executing pre-offer defences such as staggered board, poison pill, 
golden parachute, supermajority (over 80%) to approve merger, dual class recapitalisation then the 
jurisdiction would be coded 2, if some of them are banned and others are specifically discouraged 
by a non-binding code then the country is coded 1, if there is no code or rule then it is coded 0. 
Similarly, for post-bid defences the survey will look for laws and rules banning or discouraging 
asset restructuring, liability restructuring, capital restructuring and targeted repurchase (not open 
competitive bidding). 
In developing countries the share markets are generally illiquid and there is a high prevalence of 
block-holder directors. This situation can be remedied by having a minimum amount of shares with 
the public which may lead to more dispersed holding.80 In India, which as per S&P is a leading 
emerging market, only recently was it made mandatory that for listing at least 25% of the shares 
should be with public. Therefore, to ensure that markets in developing countries move towards a 
more open market it is imperative that shares become more dispersed, the first step towards this 
would be a minimum of 25% free float. 
The disclosure rule for shareholders with 5% shareholding would nullify any attempts to effect a 
creeping acquisition and allow for proper share valuation due to an expected increase in demand.  
T Impediments to cross border voting  2 if American Depositary Receipt (ADR) and Global 
depository receipt (GDR) with voting rights at par equity is allowed, 1 if ADR and GDR 
have voting rights with some restriction, 0 otherwise.
An investment bank can buy shares of companies listed at a share market in a developing country 
and later issue a negotiable security linked to these issues at a stock exchange in a developed 
country. These negotiable securities are referred to as depository receipts and their value varies 
79  See Richard S. Ruback, An Overview of Takeover Defenses in Alan J. Auerbach, (ed.) Mergers and Acquisitions 
(University of Chicago Press 1987) table 3.1 and 3.2; Pornsit Jiraporn, An empirical analysis of corporate takeover 
defences and earnings management: evidence from the US (2005) 15 (5)  Applied Financial Economics 293-303. 
80  Though Cheffins et al. Ownership Dispersion and the London Stock Exchanges 'Two-Thirds Rule': An Empirical 
Test (2012). University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 17/2012. Available at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2094538> concludes that two-thirds rule of London stock exchange was not the catalyst 
for dispersion of ownership and control that might have been expected. 
Page 32 of 50Corporate Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
C
orporate G
overnance
according to the price of the underlying share in the original host country. If depository receipts for 
foreign companies are issued in the US market they are referred as ADR and if these depository 
receipts are issued in the non US market81 it is commonly referred to as GDR.  ADR and GDR 
allows foreign capital to flow into the host country and at the same time ensures that the companies 
adhere to the deposit agreements. Deposit agreements follow a strict set of disclosures, thus 
jurisdictions which allow ADR and GDR automatically ensures that companies which choose to 
issue ADR or GDR has to comply with strict standards. Whether the ADR/GDR purchaser would 
be able to vote depends on the depository agreements, however from a pro-shareholder view any 
equity investment should be able to exert proportionate control. Thus, shareholder primacy 
corporate governance would allow default voting rights for depository receipts to be on a par with 
domestic equity shares. 
T 2 if by law external auditors need to be changed after 1-5 years and some cooling off period, 
1 if it is recommended under a non-binding code, 0 otherwise. 
A regular change in the external auditor would ensure that management always remains at arms-
length from the auditors. A quick glance at major corporate fraud like the Enron scandal, Satyam 
scandal82 would suggest that in many cases it was the willing oversight of the auditors which led to 
the delayed discovery of fraud. Thus a pro-shareholder corporate governance policy would favour a 
change of auditors at regular intervals so that the integrity of the financial information/disclosure is 
maintained.
T 2 each if it is mandatory for presence of audit committee, remuneration committee, 
nomination committee with a majority of independent directors, 1 if it recommended by a 
code, 0 otherwise.
NEDs are supposed to act as an internal control mechanism looking at a long term view. Through 
these committees they are supposed to keep watch on executive directors and managers, appoint 
auditors, fix remuneration of the executives and maintain continuity with nominating executives for 
the top positions. The majority rule has to be enforced by statutory binding regulation. Independent 
directors are those directors who do not have any financial interest in the company and whose 
remuneration is not linked with performance.
T 2 if the country has legal protection for whistle-blowers, 1 if it is recommended in a non-
binding corporate governance code etc., 0 otherwise.
Minority shareholders rights index
81  For example in European stock exchanges like Frankfurt Stock Exchange, London Stock Exchange etc.
82  Criminal prosecution of auditors is still on-going
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T Ability to influence an electing member of board  2 if cumulative voting is allowed, 1 if it 
is recommended but discretionary, 0 otherwise. 
Shareholders should be allowed to have effective control over the board by electing its members. 
Most jurisdictions offer shareholders the opportunity to elect members but in a shareholder primacy 
system cumulative voting would be allowed as minority shareholders would then be able to pool 
their votes for certain board candidates. 
T Prohibit abusive self-dealing - A score of 0 if the board of directors, the supervisory board 
or shareholders must vote and the self-dealing majority shareholder is permitted to vote, 1 if 
it is recommended under a non-binding code that the board of directors or the supervisory 
board must vote and the self-dealing majority shareholder is not permitted to vote, 2 if it is 
mandatory that the self-dealing majority shareholder is not permitted to vote; 2 if 
shareholders must vote and the self-dealing majority shareholder is not permitted to vote, 1 
if it is recommended, 0 otherwise. A score of 0 is assigned if no disclosure is required 1 if 
disclosure on the terms of the transaction is recommended, 2 if it is required; 2 if an external 
auditor is required to review the transaction before it takes place, 1 if it is recommended, 0 
otherwise. 
A majority shareholder who is also a member of the board is at a distinct advantage over minority 
shareholders in terms of insider information and control. This may also lead to the diversion of 
companys assets for personal gain and eventual expropriation. Therefore a shareholder wealth 
maximisation of corporate governance would call for strict regulations to limit any self-dealing, 
putting in place checks and balances like NEDs, external auditors and even approval in shareholder 
meetings.
T Ability to take judicial recourse - 2 if direct or derivative suits are available for 100 
shareholders or shareholders holding a minimum of 5-10% of the share capital, 1 if more 
than 10% or more than 100 shareholders are required for a suit, 0 in other cases. 
Business judgment rule prevents courts from interfering in the internal decision making process of a 
company, unless a sizeable number of shareholders approach the court. A pro-shareholder corporate 
governance policy would try to keep this threshold low so that even minority shareholders can 
approach the court to seek redressal in cases of oppression and mismanagement. Yet at the same 
time it should not be so low that the company has to always defend frivolous law suits. 
Anti-Stakeholder rights index 
T 0 if under a regulation stakeholder representation is found/encouraged in board, 1 if it is 
discouraged by a non-binding code or if there is no mention, 2 if it is prohibited by a binding 
regulation; 0 if under a regulation stakeholders or their representatives can be present/are 
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encouraged to be present in shareholders meeting, 1 if it is discouraged by a non-binding 
code 2 if it is prohibited by a binding regulation and only shareholders can be present; 2 in 
the case of a unitary managing board where a majority of its members are directly elected by 
shareholders or are selected with the concurrence of the elected members of the board, 1 
where under a non-binding code it is encouraged, 0 otherwise; 0 if stakeholders find remedy 
inside company law, 1 where there is a non-binding code under which stakeholders other 
than shareholders are offered remedy outside of company law, 2 if the company code or the 
listing agreements do not have any provision for stakeholder remedies except for 
shareholders; 0 if the country has a code of ethics for directors which explicitly states that 
stakeholder rights come before any other shareholder rights, 1 if it is recommended that 
directors give due consideration to the rights of different stakeholders but does not state if 
one group has a higher claim than another, 2 if there is a mandatory code which mentions 
that shareholders have precedence over other stakeholders. Shareholder primacy corporate 
governance demands that stakeholders like creditors, employees, suppliers and customers 
are not represented at any stage of the decision making process. They should find remedies 
outside the corporate law and corporate governance mechanism. Therefore a jurisdiction 
which mandates dual board structure with stakeholder representation would score lower in 
the overall assessment.
Appendix D
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Code snippet 1 for graded response model
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Code snippet 2 for add on Kalman filter
Code snippet 3 for Bayesian factor analysis
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Appendix B
Financial market development index
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)  International Monetary Fund defines net FDI as the net inflows 
of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an 
enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, 
reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of 
payments.  There is a wide array of literature which empirically connects improvement in 
corporate governance with an increase in FDI.  The rationale is that a country which adopts a 
stronger corporate governance regime (which provides higher investor protections) gives a 
competitive advantage to that country as Investors cherry pick the countries to which they 
allocate capital, based on the strength of investor protections. After countries undertake corporate 
governance reforms, they are more likely to draw in foreign investments.  Fazio and Talamo 
investigated this transmission channel using a two-stage version of the gravity model and 
investigate[d] the determinants of FDI flows with special reference to the institutional factors, after 
controlling for a number of traditional variables and potential incentives, such as wages and taxes.  
They found that robust corporate governance is an important factor in attracting FDI. 
Market capitalisation of listed companies  Standard & Poor defines market capitalisation or market 
value as the share price times the number of shares outstanding. Listed domestic companies are the 
domestically incorporated companies listed on the country's stock exchanges at the end of the year.  
The rationale behind linking shareholder primacy corporate governance with market capitalisation 
is the empirical evidence that firms with stronger shareholder rights had higher firm value, higher 
profits, higher sales growth, lower capital expenditures, and made fewer corporate acquisitions  
this enhances the investors optimism in the firms future cash-flow and growth prospects  leading 
to higher share prices and therefore higher market capitalisation. 
Number of IPOs  Initial public offering generally allows the shares of a company to be listed at a 
stock exchange and be bought and sold by the public.  Given the long history of stock exchange 
scams where unsuspecting investors were lured into buying worthless shares,  it is quite natural that 
strict corporate governance guidelines have been innovated to ensure continuing confidence 
amongst investors.  Microeconomic firm-level evidence shows that firms with stronger [corporate] 
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governance structures have higher IPO valuations and better long term operating performance than 
their peers.  Thus, as Prof. Coffee posits, Anglo-American style shareholder primacy corporate 
governance may be instrumental in assuring greater protections for minority shareholders and 
increased financial transparency and thereby lead to an upsurge in the number of IPOs. 
Number of listed domestic companies - Listed domestic companies are the domestically 
incorporated companies listed on the countrys stock exchanges at the end of the year.  It is widely 
used as a proxy for financial market development  as a vibrant financial market governed by 
adequate corporate governance regulation would induce private companies to seek equity funds and 
relinquish control. 
As there is high correlation between the number of firms and the number of IPOs, this survey uses 
the total number of listed domestic companies as part of the dependent index.
S&P global equity index - S&P Global Equity Indices measure the U.S. dollar price change in the 
stock markets covered by the S&P/IFCI and S&P/Frontier BMI country indices.  The theoretical 
basis for linking the equity index with corporate governance lies in the doctrine of market for 
corporate control,  where it is hypothesised that if managers of a company are unable to produce the 
desired results in the form of higher share prices then the shareholders would divest those shares, 
resulting in the fall of share prices and thereby opening the entrenched management to the perils of 
takeover and consequent loss of position. Thus, a shareholder oriented corporate governance is 
theorised to positively impact stock market performance.  
Traded volume of stocks traded  Stocks traded refers to the total value of shares traded during the 
period.  It is controlled for foreign exchange price fluctuation. This variable provides a measure of 
financial market depth, liquidity (consequently the fall in the cost of access to capital)  and acts as 
an indicator of market development and growing financialisation.  All these factors are affected by 
changes in corporate governance.
Appendix C
Macroeconomic control
Log GDP  this variable adjusts for the generally observed exponential growth of GDP and gives a 
clearer picture about the actual growth rate of GDP. This also, to an extent, nullifies the 
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autocorrelation in real GDP values.83 Log GDP acts as a proxy for economic growth. It is an 
accepted theory that there is a two way linkage between GDP and FDI, scholars like Hansen,84 Basu 
et al.,85 Hsiao86 etc. have clearly enumerated the long term relationship between FDI and GDP. 
There is also an accepted relationship between GDP and the stock index,87 as higher log GDP 
usually translates into an increase in industrial output, which pari passu in turn should increase 
share prices. The data will be sourced from WB WDI dataset. 
Log GNP  log GNP adjusts for the actual growth of GNP, it thus provides for the growth in 
market value of all the goods and services produced in one year by labour and property supplied by 
the citizens of a country. Therefore it can account for an increase in the industrial productions, 
based on the investment made in a different country and consequently can supplement GDP values 
which focus solely on the geographical location of production. Scholars like Cutler et al.,88 Dhakal 
et al.,89 Mahdavi90 etc. have shown that there is a causality between market variations and GNP. 
The data will be sourced from WB WDI dataset. However owing to the high correlation between 
log GDP and log GNP, we will not use log GNP.
Log PPP  Purchasing power parity determines the relative value of different currencies, thus an 
increase in PPP would allow researchers to estimate the economic growth especially when the real 
GDP (which is pegged to a historic USD value) can fluctuate based on varying exchange rates. 
Thus log PPP complements both log GDP and log GNP in proxying for macroeconomic growth by 
83  For advantages of using log GDP and its impact on health please refer to Aghion et al., The relationship between 
health and growth: when Lucas meets Nelson-Phelps, (2010) National Bureau of Economic Research No. w15813 
available at <http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/aghion/files/relationship_between_health.pdf> 
84  Henrik Hansen and John Rand, On the causal links between FDI and growth in developing countries (2006) 29 
(1) The World Economy 21-41
85  Basu et al., Liberalization, FDI, and growth in developing countries: a panel cointegration approach (2003) 41 (3) 
Economic Inquiry 510-516.
86   Frank S.T. Hsiao and Mei-Chu W. Hsiao, FDI, exports, and GDP in East and Southeast AsiaPanel data versus 
time-series causality analyses (2006) 17 (6) Journal of Asian Economics 1082
87  See generally Holger Sandte, Stock Markets vs GDP Growth: A Complicated Mixture (2012) WestLB Mellon 
Asset Management Viewpoint 1  8 available at http://us.bnymellonam.com/core/library/documents 
/knowledge/AlphaTrends/Stock_Markets_vs_GDP.pdf; Lena Saeed Shiblee IV, The Impact of Inflation, GDP, 
Unemployment, and Money Supply On Stock Prices (2009) available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1529254; N 
Groenewold Fraser, Share Prices and Macroeconomic Factors (1997) 24 (9-10) Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting 1367-1383
88  Cutler et al., What moves stock prices? in Peter L. Bernstein and Frank L. Fabozzi (eds.), Streetwise: The Best of 
the Journal of Portfolio Management (Princeton University Press 1998) 56-63.
89  Dharmendra Dhakal et al., Causality between the money supply and share prices: a VAR investigation (1993) 
Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics 52-74.
90  Saeid Mahdavi and Ahmad Sohrabian, The link between the rate of growth of stock prices and the rate of growth 
of GNP in the United States: a Granger causality test (1991) The American Economist 41-48.
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stabilising inflationary forces.91 This connection between PPP, capital flow, exchange rates and 
market growth has been explored by other researchers like Hung,92 Ammer,93 Sarno,94 etc. The data 
will be sourced from the WB WDI dataset.
Balance of payment or Current a/c balance  this records all the financial transactions between 
the economy of the country and rest of the world, it can be crudely defined as the difference 
between the cost of import and export of all goods and services. Balance of payment has a direct 
effect on exchange rates,95 exchange rate has direct impact on FDI.96 Also if a country had suffered 
a balance of payment crisis its financial market would have reacted adversely during that period,97 
controlling for balance of payment would allow for the negation of such variations. The data will be 
sourced from the WB WDI dataset.
Deposit and lending interest rates  The World Bank defines interest rate spread as the interest 
rate charged by banks on loans to private sector customers minus the interest rate paid by 
commercial or similar banks for demand, time, or savings deposits. The Central banks of countries 
vary the interest rates and so stimulate or slow down economies by increasing or restricting the flow 
of money and easy credit. Therefore the interest rates have a direct impact on the financial market.98 
Thus, interest rates can be used to control for monetary policy and structural shocks, inflationary 
91  B Chowdhry et al., Extracting inflation from stock returns to test purchasing power parity (2005) 95 (1) 
American Economic Review 255-276
92  Mao-Wei Hung and Yin-Ching Jan, Use of deviations of purchasing power parity and interest rate parity to clarify 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis (2002) 5 (2) Review of Pacific Basin financial markets and policies 195
93  J Ammer and JP Mei, Measuring international economic linkages with stock market data (1996) 51 (5) Journal 
Of Finance 1743-1763
94  Lucio Sarno and Giorgio Valente, Deviations from purchasing power parity under different exchange rate 
regimes: Do they revert and, if so, how? (2006) 30 (11) Journal of Banking & Finance 31473169; See also Akram 
et al., Does the law of one price hold in international financial markets? Evidence from tick data(2009) 33 (10) 
Journal of Banking & Finance 1741-1754.
95  Magda Kandil, Exchange Rate Fluctuations and the Balance of Payments: Channels of Interaction in Developing 
and Developed Countries (2009) 24 (1) Journal of Economic Integration 191-174
96  See generally Michael W. Klein and Eric Rosengren, The real exchange rate and foreign direct investment in the 
United States: relative wealth vs. relative wage effects (1994) 36 (3) Journal of international Economics 373-389; 
Kenneth A. Froot and Jeremy C. Stein, Exchange rates and foreign direct investment: an imperfect capital markets 
approach (1992) NBER Working Paper No. 2914; Bruce A. Blonigen, Firm-specific assets and the link between 
exchange rates and foreign direct investment (1997) The American Economic Review  447-465; Linda S. 
Goldberg and Charles D. Kolstad, Foreign direct investment, exchange rate variability and demand uncertainty. 
(1994) NBER Research Working paper No. 4815 published at (1995) 36 (4) International Economic Review 855.
97  See generally Matthieu Bussière, Balance of payment crises in emerging markets: how early were the early 
warning signals? (2013) 45 (12) Applied Economics 1601-1620
98  Md Mahmudul Alam and Md Gazi Salah Uddin, Relationship between interest rate and stock price: empirical 
evidence from developed and developing countries. (2009) 4 (3) International Journal of Business and 
Management 43; Clive Coetzee, Monetary conditions and stock returns: a South African case study (2002) 
EconWPA working paper no. 0205002; Zivanemoyo Chinzara, Macroeconomic uncertainty and emerging market 
stock market volatility: The case for South Africa (2010) Economic Research Southern Africa Working paper 187.
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pressure etc. and its effect on financial market.99 The data will be sourced from the WB WDI 
dataset.
External debt  this is the public debt that is owed to foreign financial institutions.100 International 
lenders keep an eye on the ratio of GDP to external rate to secure themselves against the risk of 
default.101 Thus when the foreign investment dries up smaller economies can fall into a growth trap 
where because of lower investment there is slower economic growth.102 Research has now clearly 
shown that higher external debts lead to ever increasing debt servicing burden, which has a negative 
effect on the productivity of labour and capital, leading to adverse effects on long term economic 
growth.103 Hence, it is important to control for the negative impact of debt pressure and systemic 
shocks on financial growth especially in smaller emerging economies.104
Financial and technological inclusion
Banks per capita  the number of banks per capita can be considered as a rough approximation of 
financial inclusion and the development of the banking sector. Financial inclusion plays a vital role 
in allowing marginal populations to directly or indirectly access capital and influence economic 
growth.105 A robust banking sector is also an indicator of a vibrant stock market and long-term 
99  See generally Ronald Mangani, Monetary policy, structural breaks and JSE returns. (2011) 73 Investment 
Analysts Journal 27-35; K. S  Mallick and M. R. Sousa, Inflationary pressures and monetary policy: evidence from 
BRICS economies. (2011) Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis in Social Sciences Conference available at www. 
qass. org. uk/2011-May_Brunel-conference/Mallick.pdf; Michael Hewson and Lumengo Bonga-Bonga, The 
effects of monetary policy shocks on stock returns in South Africa: a structural vector error correction model 
(2005) Economic Society of South Africa Conference, Durban.
100  World Development Index defines external debt stock as Total external debt is debt owed to nonresidents 
repayable in currency, goods, or services. Total external debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private 
nonguaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF credit, and short-term debt. Short-term debt includes all debt having an 
original maturity of one year or less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.DOD.DECT.CD?cid=GPD_31>
101  See generally Daniel Cohen and Jeffrey Sachs, Growth and external debt under risk of debt repudiation. (1986) 
30 (3) European Economic Review 529-560.
102  Pierre Villa, Financial constraint and growth in the developing countries (1998) 49 (1) Revue Economique 103-
117
103  Hameed et al., External debt and its impact on economic and business growth in Pakistan. (2008) 20 International 
Research Journal of Finance and Economics 132-140; See also Cristina Checherita-Westphal and Philipp Rother, 
The impact of high government debt on economic growth and its channels: An empirical investigation for the euro 
area. (2012) 56 (7) European Economic Review 1392-1405; For a neoclassical economic perspective see Peter A. 
Diamond, National debt in a neoclassical growth model. (1965) The American Economic Review 1126-1150.
104  See generally Catherine A. Pattillo et al., External debt and growth (2002) International Monetary Fund working 
paper No. 02/69; see also Benedict J. Clements et al., External debt, public investment, and growth in low-income 
countries. (2003) International Monetary Fund Working paper no. 2249; Augustin Kwasi Fosu, The external debt 
burden and economic growth in the 1980s: evidence from sub-Saharan Africa. (1999) 20 (2)  Canadian Journal of 
Development Studies 307-318.
105  See Levine and Zervos (n 83); See also Thorsten Beck and Ross Levine, Stock markets, banks, and growth: Panel 
evidence. (2004) 28 (3)  Journal of Banking & Finance 423-442. 
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economic growth.106 This phenomenon is however largely confined to economies with lower 
financial inclusion (such as the majority of developing countries) where a large part of the 
population does not have access to formal capital structures and have to depend on usurious loans 
and thus have rippled negative economic effects.107 Hence, to isolate the effects of corporate 
governance on the overall financial market it is important from the context of developing countries 
that we control for varying financial inclusion.
Access to ICT - information and communication technology has led to the structural reorganisation 
of the financial market through extending trade, reorganising capital and enhancing the availability 
of information.108 Easier access to ICT encourages SMEs and populations from weaker economic 
areas to interact with the economic mainstream and can lead to economic growth, there have been 
studies with panel data which have shown links between ICT use and the growth rate of GDP per 
capita.109 Therefore, information on inclusion measured by the number of internet users and the 
number of mobile subscriptions per 1000 inhabitants provides a general control metric for its effect 
on financial and economic growth.110 
Access to electricity and power consumption per capita  access to electricity and electricity 
consumption per capita is a proxy for the level of industrialisation and therefore has a direct effect 
on foreign direct investment and other financial market indicators.111 It is thus believed that access 
106  Ross Levine, The legal environment, banks, and long-run economic growth. (1998) Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking 596-613.
107  See Vighneswara Swamy, Financial Inclusion, Gender Dimension, and Economic Impact on Poor Households 
(2014) 56 World Development 1-15; Jake Kendall, Local financial development and growth (2012) 36 (5) Journal 
of Banking and Finance 1548-1562; Mohammad Shafi and Ali Hawi Medabesh, Financial Inclusion in Developing 
Countries: Evidences from an Indian State (2012) 5 (8) International Business Research 116; Panicos O. 
Demetriades and Kul B. Luintel, Financial development, economic growth and banking sector controls: evidence 
from India. (1996) The Economic Journal 359-374; Mandira Sarma and Jesim Pais, Financial inclusion and 
development. (2011) 23 (5) Journal of International Development 613-628. For a developed country perspective 
see Klaus Neusser and Maurice Kugler, Manufacturing growth and financial development: Evidence from OECD 
countries. (1998) 80 (4) Review of Economics and Statistics 638-646.
108  Maryam Farhadi et al., Information and Communication Technology Use and Economic Growth (2012) 7 (11) 
PLoS ONE available at http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0048903
109  ibid
110  See generally Sanjeev Dewan and Kenneth L. Kraemer, Information Technology and Productivity: Evidence from 
Country-Level Data (2000) 46 (4) Management Science 548-562; Sang-Yong Tom Lee et al., Time series analysis 
in the assessment of ICT impact at the aggregate level  lessons and implications for the new economy (2005) 42 
(7) Information & Management 1009; Hwan-Joo Seo and Young Soo Lee, Contribution of information and 
communication technology to total factor productivity and externalities effects (2006) 12 (2) Information 
Technology for Development 159-173; for a review of the literature see Erik Brynjolfsson and Shinkyu Yang, 
Information Technology and Productivity: A Review of the Literature (1996) 43 Advances in computer 179214; 
for a developed country perspective see K Motohashi, ICT diffusion And Its Economic Impact In OECD 
Countries. (1997) 20 STI Reviews 13-45; J Jalava and M Pohjola, Economic growth in the new economy: 
Evidence from advanced economies. (2002) 14 (2) Information Economics and Policy 189210.
111  Alice Shiu and Pun-Lee Lam, Electricity consumption and economic growth in China. (2004) 32 (1) Energy 
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to electricity would become a part of access to resources and augment the classical growth 
theory.112 Several researchers have shown bi-directional causality between economic growth and 
power consumption,113 therefore, it is imperative that access to electricity and power consumption 
per capita be used as a control variable to insulate the effects of corporate governance policies on 
the growth of the financial market. 
Human development index  this is a summary measure of average achievement in key 
dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent 
standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three 
dimensions.114 HDI can therefore act as a proxy for level of education, health and general standard 
of living.115 It is theorised that the improvement of HDI is concurrent and co-dependent on 
economic growth as a more educated long living population should foster more economic growth 
which in turn would increase spending on health and education leading to a virtuous cycle.116 Due 
to the relative stability of the variable over time, this variable is used as a country level control 
indicator.
policy 47-54; Jiahai Yuan et al., Electricity consumption and economic growth in China: cointegration and co-
feature analysis. (2007) 29 (6) Energy Economics 1179-1191; Sajal Ghosh, Electricity consumption and economic 
growth in India. (2002) 30 (2) Energy policy 125-129; Nicholas Apergis and James E. Payne, Energy 
consumption and economic growth in Central America: evidence from a panel cointegration and error correction 
model. (2009) 31 (2) Energy Economics 211-216; Yemane Wolde-Rufael, Electricity consumption and economic 
growth: a time series experience for 17 African countries (2006) 34 (10) Energy Policy 1106-1114; Galip Altinay 
and Erdal Karagol, Electricity consumption and economic growth: evidence from Turkey. (2005) 27 (6) Energy 
Economics 849-856; for a developed country perspective see S Smiech and M Papiez, Energy consumption and 
economic growth in the light of meeting the targets of energy policy in the EU: The bootstrap panel Granger 
causality approach (2014) 71 Energy Policy118-129; Jaruwan Chontanawat et al., Does energy consumption 
cause economic growth?: Evidence from a systematic study of over 100 countries (2008) 30 (2) Journal of Policy 
Modeling 209-220.
112  Anis Omri and Bassem Kahouli, Causal relationships between energy consumption, foreign direct investment and 
economic growth: Fresh evidence from dynamic simultaneous-equations models (2014) 67 Energy Policy 913-922
113  John Asafu-Adjaye, The relationship between energy consumption, energy prices and economic growth: time 
series evidence from Asian developing countries (2000) 22 (6) Energy economics 615-625; Ugur Soytas and 
Ramazan Sari, Energy consumption and GDP: causality relationship in G-7 countries and emerging markets 
(2003) 25 (1) Energy economics 33-37; for a counter opinion see Shyamal Paul and Rabindra N. Bhattacharya, 
Causality between energy consumption and economic growth in India: a note on conflicting results (2004) 26 (6) 
Energy Economics 977-983.
114  United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2014; for a more critical view see Mark 
McGillivray, The human development index: yet another redundant composite development indicator? (1991) 19 
(10) World Development 1461-1468; Ambuj D.Sagar and Adil Najam, The human development index: a critical 
review (1998) 25 (3) Ecological economics 249-264; Jack Hou, The dynamics of Human Development Index 
(2014) The Social Science Journal doi:10.1016/j.soscij.2014.07.003; Martin Ravallion, Troubling tradeoffs in the 
Human Development Index (2012) 99 (2) Journal of Development Economics 201-209
115  See Technical notes in United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2014 available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14_technical_notes.pdf
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Gini coefficient is an ad hoc measure for income inequality.117 It is theorised that a higher Gini 
coefficient denoting a higher income inequality would result in more conflicts, skewed political 
decisions favouring further accumulation of capital and lower spending on developing human 
capital118 leading to less sustainable economic growth.119 However this view has been challenged by 
numerous scholars who argue that in the short and medium term income inequality actually fosters 
higher economic growth.120 However a different strand of scholarship finds a direct correlative link 
between increases in wealth inequality and stock market participation, smaller increases in 
consumption inequality and the fraction of indebted households, and a decline in interest rates121 
especially in booming economies. Therefore, in spite of several shortcomings, Gini coefficient 
gives a proxy for poverty and inequality which is not adequately measured by HDI. Due to the 
relative stability of the variable over time, this variable is used as a country level control indicator.
Enforcement quality
Global Peace Index  this index attempts to calculate the relative peace in a country. It compiles 
around 22 individual qualitative and quantitative indicators under three broad themes: the level of 
safety and security in society; the extent of domestic or international conflict; and the degree of 
militarisation.122 Civil strife and conflicts have significant negative economic effects as they raise 
116  Alejandro Ramirez et al., Economic Growth and Human Development (1997) Yale University working paper no. 
18; Gustav Ranis et al., Economic growth and human development (2000) 28 (2) World development 197-219; 
Gustav Ranis and Frances Stewart, Dynamic Links between the Economy and Human Development (2005) 
Department of Economics and Social Affairs (UN) Working Paper available at 
http://economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/12091/1/Ranis%2520%26%2520Stewart.pdf; Sudhir Anand and Amartya Sen, The 
income component of the human development index (2000) 1 (1) Journal of human development 83-106; Ghulam 
Akhmat et al., Impact of financial development on SAARC'S human development (2013) Quality and Quantity 1-
16.
117  Robert Dorfman, A formula for the Gini coefficient (1979) The Review of Economics and Statistics 146.
118  See generally Amparo Castelló and Rafael Doménech, Human capital inequality and economic growth: some new 
evidence (2002) 112 (478) The economic journal C187-C200.
119  Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? Theory and Evidence (1991) University 
of California at Berkley working paper no. 91-155; Alberto Alesina and Dani Rodrik, Distributive politics and 
economic growth (1991) National Bureau of Economic Research working paper no. 3668 available at 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w3668> published at (1994) 109 (2) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 465.
120  See Kristin J. Forbes, A Reassessment of the Relationship between Inequality and Growth (2000) American 
economic review 869-887; Hongyi Li and Heng-fu Zou, Income Inequality is not Harmful for Growth: Theory and 
Evidence (1998) 2 (3) Review of Development Economics 318-334; Robert J. Barro, Inequality and Growth in a 
Panel of Countries (2000) 5 (1) Journal of economic growth 5-32; see also Simon Kuznets, Economic growth and 
income inequality (1955) The American Economic Review 1-28.
121  Jack Favilukis, Inequality, stock market participation, and the equity premium (2013) 107 (3) Journal of 
Financial Economics 740-759; for the knock on effect of income inequality especially on asset pricing see Daniel 
Barczyk and Matthias Kredler, Inequality and asset prices (2015) Working Paper available at < 
http://danielbarczyk-research.mcgill.ca/research_files/Asset_Dec15.pdf >; Yilin Zhang, Income Inequality and 
Asset Prices: A Cross-Country Study (2013) working paper available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2021287
122  Institute of Economics & Peace, Global Peace Index: Measuring peace and assessing country risk (2014) available 
online at http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2014%20Global%20Peace%20Index%20 
REPORT.pdf
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expenditure on violence containment thereby increasing the cost of business etc. Most developing 
countries score lower on the peace index and are theorised to lose between 5%-10% of their GDP 
on violence containment.123 The link between conflicts and economic growth seems quite clear, 
conflicts lead to diversion of resources from economically useful ventures to more security oriented 
sectors with less economic return.124 The peace index can also stand as a proxy for political 
stability.125 In recent years terrorism has led to short lived but major distortions in financial 
markets.126 The peace index is available only from 2007 onwards. The unavailability of data for the 
major part of the time period studied in this research, along with the probable relative stability of 
the variable over time, this variable is best used as a country level indicator.
Rule of law  the index is sourced from the World Justice Project, it comprises of 47 indicators 
organized around 8 themes: constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open 
government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and 
criminal justice.127 Rule of law is important for economic and financial growth at several levels - it 
repudiates crony capitalism leading to fair allocation of resources, reduces incidences of corruption 
like bribery etc.; a vibrant judicial system can control excesses of executive and legislature and 
provide a safety net for foreign investors, a perception of higher rule of law along with confidence 
123  Institute of Economics & Peace, The economic cost of violence containment: a comprehensive assessment of the 
global cost of violence (2014) available at http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/The%20
Economic%20Cost%20of%20Violence%20Containment.pdf
124  John Bates Clark, For a historical treatment of the issue see The Economic Costs of War (1916) 6 (1) The 
American Economic Review 85-93; William S. Rossiter, The Statistical Side of the Economic Costs of War 
(1916) 6 (1) The American Economic Review 94-117; for a more recent treatment of the issue see Ron P. Smith, 
The economic costs of military conflict (2014) 51 (2) Journal of Peace Research 245-256; Frances Stewart and 
Valpy Fitzgerald, The Economic and Social Consequences of Conflict (Oxford University Press 2000); Vincenzo 
Bove and Leandro Elia, The impact of American and British involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq on health 
spending, military spending and economic growth (2014) 14 (1) The BE Journal of Macroeconomics 325339; 
Gregory D. Hess, The economic welfare cost of conflict: an empirical assessment (2003) CESifo Working Paper 
No. 852; Edward Miguel et al., Economic shocks and civil conflict: An instrumental variables approach (2004) 
112 (4) Journal of political Economy 725-753; Paul Collier, On the economic consequences of civil war (1999) 51 
(1) Oxford economic papers 168-183; Richard Dorsett, The effect of the Troubles on GDP in Northern Ireland 
(2013) 29 European Journal of Political Economy 119-133; Alberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabal, Terrorism and 
the world economy (2008) 52 (1) European Economic Review 1-27
125  See generally Cristina Bodea and Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, Political Violence and Economic Growth, (2008) World 
Bank, Washington available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/6805; Alberto Alesina et al., 
Political instability and economic growth (1996) 1 (2) Journal of Economic growth  189-211.
126  Christos Kollias et al., European Markets Reactions to Exogenous Shocks: A High Frequency Data Analysis of 
the 2005 London Bombings (2013) 1 (4) International Journal of Financial Studies 154; for ripple effects of 
interconnected stock exchanges in a globalised world see also M Pericoli and M Sbracia, A primer on financial 
contagion (2003) 17 Journal of Economic Surveys 571-608; I. Meric and G Meric, Co-movements of European 
equity markets before and after the 1987 crash (1997) Multinational Finance Journal 137-152; W N Goetzmann et 
al., Long-term global market correlations (2005) 78 (1) The Journal of Business 1-38; Lorenzo Cappiello et al., 
Asymmetric Dynamics in the Correlations of Global Equity and Bond Returns (2006) 4 (4) Journal of Financial 
Econometrics 537-572; F Longin and B Solnik, Is the correlation in international equity returns constant: 1960
1990? (1995) Journal of International Money and Finance 3-26.
127  World Justice Project, WJP Rule of Law Index 2014 at http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index
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in judicial integrity and impartial market regulators would thus allow for a growth in inflow of 
capital and more robust capital market.128 Therefore a country with better rule of law would have 
higher economic development and market growth.129 Rule of law can also act as a proxy for 
political stability along with judicial and administrative independence.130 The WJP rule of law index 
is available only from 2007 onwards. The unavailability of data for the major part of the time period 
studied in this research, along with the probable relative stability of the variable over time, this 
variable is best used as a country level indicator.
Industrial value addition through R&D
High technology export  WB defines high-technology exports as products with high R&D 
intensity, such as in aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical 
machinery.131 It can act as a proxy for the level of industrialisation in a society, as per the theories 
of comparative and competitive advantages of international trade, it is the ultimate goal of societies 
to move from low value addition to high technology exports through lowering the costs of 
manufacture.132 Thus we would expect to find mature developing countries to have higher 
technological exports and be recipients of higher technology transfer.133 These exports also 
128  Randall Peerenboom (eds.) Asian Discourses of Rule of Law (Routledge 2003); see also Timothy A. Canova, 
Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law: From Market Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian 
Regulatory Model (2009) Chapman University Law Research Paper No. 09-39 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1489492> published as (2009) 3 Harvard Law & Policy Review 369; Kenneth W. Dam, 
The law-growth nexus: The rule of law and economic development (Brookings Institution Press 2007); Jan-Erik 
Lane, Law and economics in the ASEAN +3 region: The rule of law deficit (2011) 38 (10) International Journal 
of Social Economics 847-857; Banjo Roxas et al., Effects of rule of law on firm performance in South Africa 
(2012) 24 (5) European Business Review 478-492; Stephan Haggard and Lydia Tiede, The Rule of Law and 
Economic Growth: Where are We? (2011) 39 (5) World Development 673-685; Witold J. Henisz, The 
institutional environment for economic growth (2000) 12 (1) Economics & Politics 1-31; T Krever, The Legal 
Turn in Late Development Theory: The Rule of Law and the World Bank's Development Model (2011) 52 (1)  
Harvard International Law Journal 287-319
129  The only exception seems to be China, see JiangYu Wang, Rule of Law and Rule of Officials: Shareholder 
Litigation and Anti-Dumping Practice in China (2008) Rule of Law in China Series Policy Brief No. 4 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1126202; Kenneth W. Dam, China as a Test Case: Is the Rule of Law Essential for 
Economic Growth? (2006) U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 275 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=880125; Yingyi Qian, How Reform Worked in China (2002) William Davidson Institute 
Working Paper Number 473 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.317460; for a similar perspective but from competition 
law see Bruce M. Owen et al., Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive Compatibility (2006) Stanford Law 
and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 295 <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.595801> also published at (2005) 1 
(1) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 123; Franklin Allen et al., Law, finance, and economic growth in 
China (2005) 77 (1) Journal of financial economics 57-116.
130  See Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using 
a New Set of Indicators (2003) CESifo Working Paper Series No. 906 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=395403> 
published at (2003) 19 (3) European Journal of Political Economy 497; Kenneth W. Dam, The Judiciary and 
Economic Development (2006) U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 287 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.892030>; Paul H. Rubin, Legal Systems as Frameworks for Market Exchanges 
(2003) <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.413626> published in Claude Menard and Mary M. Shirley (eds) Handbook 
of New Institutional Economics (Springer 2005) 205-228.
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influence the inflow of FDI134 and have a bidirectional positive effect on the financial market and 
economic growth.135
Number of patent and trademark applications acts as a proxy for investment in R&D, level of 
industrialisation and as an indicator of technological activities.136 There is an established link 
between R&D and economic growth,137 however its effect on the financial market is uncertain. 
Some commentators and researchers show a negative link between increased R&D expenditure and 
stock prices, arguing shareholder short-termism138 while other scholars argue for positive long term 
impact.139 There is yet another branch of research which links R&D and capital expenditure to 
corporate governance and tries to explain that the transmission channel for the effects of R&D on 
the financial market runs through the emergence and pre-eminence of Anglo-American corporate 
governance which may focus on short term turnovers.140 Thus R&D stands in a unique position 
131  WB WDI 2014 available online at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.TECH.CD>
132  See generally Belay Seyoum, The role of factor conditions in high-technology exports: An empirical examination 
(2004) 15 (1) The Journal of High Technology Management Research 145-162; Belay Seyoum, Determinants of 
levels of high technology exports an empirical investigation (2005) 13 (1) Advances in Competitiveness Research 
64; for a more specific case study see Miaojie Yu, Moving up the value chain in manufacturing for China in 
Yiping Huang and Juzhong Zhuang (eds.) Can PRC escape the middle-income trap (2011); Kevin P. Gallagher and 
Roberto Porzecanski, Climbing Up the Technology Ladder? High-Technology Exports in China and Latin 
America (2008) Center for Latin American Studies Working paper series; Abhijit Sharma and Michael Dietrich, 
The Structure and Composition of Indias Exports and Industrial Transformation (19802000) (2007) 21 (2) 
International Economic Journal 207-231; for a developed country perspective see Pontus Braunerhjelm and Per 
Thulin, Can countries create comparative advantages? R&D expenditures, high-tech exports and country size in 19 
OECD countries, 19811999 (2008) 22 (1) International economic journal 95-111.
133  See generally Lei Yang and Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights, Technology Transfer and Exports in 
Developing Countries (2008) CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2464 also published at (2009) 90 (2) Journal of 
Development Economics 231-236; Frederick M. Abbott, Comparative Study of Selected Government Policies for 
Promoting Transfer of Technology and Competitiveness in the Colombian Pharmaceutical Sector (2007) United 
States Agency for International Development - Programa MIDAS, Public Law Research Paper; Brett Berger and 
Robert F. Martin, The Chinese Export Boom: An Examination of the Detailed Trade Data (2013) 21 (1) China & 
Page 48 of 50Corporate Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
C
orporate G
overnance
World Economy 64-90.
134  See Louis T. Wells, Third world multinationals: The rise of foreign investments from developing countries (MIT 
Press Books 1983); Haishun Sun and Frank Tipton, A Comparative Analysis of the Characteristics of Direct 
Foreign Investment in China, 1979-1995 (1998) 32 (2) The Journal of Developing Areas 159; Alviny So, 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone: China's Struggle for Independent Development (1988) 9 (2) Canadian Journal 
of Development Studies 313-323; Sanjaya Lall, Technological change and industrialization in the Asian newly 
industrializing economies: achievements and challenges in Linsu Kim and Richard R. Nelson (eds.) Technology, 
learning, & innovation: Experiences of newly industrializing economies (Cambridge University Press 2000) 13-68; 
Sanjaya Lall, Export performance, technological upgrading and foreign direct investment strategies in the Asian 
newly industrializing economies: with special reference to Singapore in ECLAC, Division of Production, 
Productivity and Management, Unit of Investment and Corporate Strategies, 2000 available at 
http://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/4461/S00080739_en.pdf?sequence=1
135  Sajid Anwar and Lan Phi Nguyen, Foreign direct investment and export spillovers: Evidence from Vietnam 
(2011) 20 (2) International Business Review 177-193; Qun Bao et al., Do High-technology Exports Cause More 
Technology Spillover in China? (2012) 20 (2) China & World Economy 1-22; I. E. Frolov and K. K. Lebedev, 
Assessing the impact of high-technology exports on the growth rate and structure of the Russian economy (2007) 
18 (5) Studies on Russian Economic Development 490-500; for a developed country perspective see Robert T. 
Green and Arthur W. Allaway, Identification of export opportunities: a shift-share approach (1985) The Journal of 
Marketing 83-88; for a critical view of high technology export oriented economy see Ishak Shari, Economic 
growth and income inequality in Malaysia, 197195 (2000) 5 (1) Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 112-124.
136  Daniele Archibugi and Mario Pianta, Measuring technological through patents and innovation surveys (1996) 16 
(9) Technovation 451-468.
137  See J. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (Harvard University Press 1934); H. Ansoff, Corporate 
Strategy (McGraw-Hill 1965); Edward J. Malecki, Technology and Economic Development: The Dynamics of 
Local, Regional, and National Change (1997) University of Illinois working paper series; David T. Coe and 
Elhanan Helpman, International R&D spillovers (1995) 39 (5) European Economic Review 859-887; Nancy L. 
Stokey, R&D and economic growth (1995) 62 (3) The Review of Economic Studies 469-489; for a developed 
country perspective see Walter G. Park, International R&D spillovers and OECD economic growth (1995) 33 (4) 
Economic Inquiry 571-591; Edwin Mansfield, Contribution of R&D to econ mic growth in the United States 
(1972) Science 477-486; Rachel Griffith et al., Mapping the two faces of R&D: productivity growth in a panel of 
OECD industries (200) 86 (4) Review of Economics and Statistics 883-895; Beñat BilbaoOsorio and Andrés 
RodríguezPose, From R&D to innovation and economic growth in the EU (2004) 35 (4) Growth and Change 
434-455.. for a view that intellectual property regime, which may affect R&D, affects economic growth see  Keith 
E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights And Foreign Direct Investment (2000) Centre for International Economic 
Studies Working Paper No. 22; Robert E. Litan et al., Rules for Growth: Promoting Innovation and Growth 
Through Legal Reform Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 426, Stanford Law and Economics Olin 
Working Paper No. 410, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1757982; Rod Falvey et al., Intellectual 
Property Rights and Economic Growth (2005) Internationalisation of Economic Policy Research Paper No. 
2004/12 published at (2006) 10 (4) Review of Development Economics 700; Bryan Christopher Mercurio, 
Reconceptualising the Debate on Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development (2010) 3 (1) The Law 
and Development Review 65; Lewis Davis and M. Fuat Sener, Intellectual Property Rights, Institutional Quality 
and Economic Growth (2012) working paper series available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1815258>.
138  See P. Drucker, A crisis of capitalism Wall Street Journal (30 September 1986) 31; J. Stein, Takeover threats 
and managerial myopia (1988) 96 Journal of Political Economy 6180; M. Porter, Capital disadvantage: 
America's failing capital investment system (1992) 70 Harvard Business Review 6582; B. Hall, The stock 
market's valuation of R&D investment during the 1980s (1993) 83 American Economic Review 259264
139  See S.H. Chan et al., Corporate research and development expenditures and share value (1990) 26 Journal of 
Financial Economics 255276; S. Szewczyk et al., The valuation of corporate R&D expenditures: evidence from 
investment opportunities and free cash flow (1996) 25 Financial Management 105110; L. Chan et al., The stock 
market valuation of research and development expenditures (2001) 56 Journal of Finance 24312456; Mohsen 
Saad and Zaher Zantout, Stock price and systematic risk effects of discontinuation of corporate R&D programs 
(2009) 16 (4) Journal of Empirical Finance 568-581; for studies which show mixed results see D. Chambers et al., 
Excess returns to R&D-intensive firms (2000) 7 Review of Accounting Studies 133158; A. Eberhart et al., An 
examination of long-term abnormal stock returns and operating performance following R&D increases (2004) 59 
Journal of Finance 623650. 
140 See Alfred Haid and Jürgen Weigand, R&D, liquidity constraints, and corporate governance (2001) Journal of 
Economics and Statistics 145-167; Kee H. Chung, Peter Wright and Ben Kedia, Corporate governance and market 
valuation of capital and R&D investments (2003) 12 (2) Review of Financial Economics 161; Rob Bauer, Robin 
Braun and Gordon L. Clark, The emerging market for European corporate governance: the relationship between 
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among the variables studied in that it behaves as a control variable (it affects economic growth and 
the financial market) and at the same time also shows characteristics of interdependent variable (it 
is directly affected by the type of corporate governance policies chosen by the polity).
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